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Executive Summary
1. Introduction
This comparative and historical project, covering the period 1974-2007, is 
focused on two eras of political violence in Britain, the irst coinciding with 
the Irish ‘Troubles’ and the second since 2001.
The research examined to what extent and in what ways Irish communities 
and Muslim communities were represented as ‘suspect’ in public discourse 
in these two eras; it examined the similarities and differences in the impact 
of these representations and counter-terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities and Irish communities in Britain. 
Our aim was to explore the implications for social cohesion of representing 
some groups as ‘suspect’ and what lessons can be learnt from evolving 
understandings of and responses to national security threats. The research 
provides a new analysis of Irish experiences and compares this with current 
Muslim experiences. Our critical assessment of British counter-terrorism 
policies over four decades offers useful insights to policy-makers who 
seek ways to implement counter-terrorism policies without alienating 
communities.
This report highlights the main indings of our research in relation to four 
questions:
• How is a community constructed as ‘suspect’ in public discourse   
 (government and media) and through the implementation of counter-  
 terrorism measures?
• What differences and similarities are there in the construction and   
 representation of Irish and Muslims as ‘suspect’ communities? 
• What impacts do representations of being ‘suspect’ and counter-terrorism  
 measures have for the everyday experiences and sense of belonging of   
 members of these communities?
• How do these constructions and representations of ‘suspect’ communities  
 inform reconigurations and representations of Britishness? 
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2 Methods
We adopted a multi-level method of research. This involved the analysis of a) public discourses in policy 
documents and the media, and of b) experiences and memories of ordinary invididuals belonging to the two 
sets of communities, and of privileged witnesses of the period under investigation. 19 ‘key events’ between 
1974 and 2007 constituted the basis of the comparison.
2.1 The study of public discourses involved:
• Over 800 policy documents, including government statements, strategic papers and political   
 speeches as well as parliamentary debates, and reports by select committees and public agencies, at  
 key moments between 1974 and 2011.
• 2798 news items We evaluated representations of Irish communities and Muslim communities in the  
 national press (Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, Observer, Sun,  
 News of the World) and in the diaspora press (Asian Times, Irish Post, Muslim News)
2.2. Investigation of the experiences of Irish and Muslim communities through:
• 42 key informant interviews with community and religious leaders; human rights activists;   
 journalists, politicians and lawyers and others who had some involvement with the communities or  
 community members during the period under study.
• Seven mixed Irish and Muslim discussion groups (three in Birmingham, four in London): a total
 of 38 people - 19 identifying as Irish, 19 as Muslim, 19 men and 19 women, and of different ages -  
 participated in  these events. 
The key events
Irish-related events    Muslim-related events
21 November 1974: Birmingham pub bombings 14 February 1989: fatwa on Salman Rushdie
29 November 1974: adoption of the PTA  Spring/Summer 2001: race riots
3 December 1974: arrest of the Maguire Seven 9  March 2004: release of the Tipton Three
17 December 1983: Harrods Bombing  July 2005: London bombings
19 October 1989: release of the Guildford Four 22 July 2005: shooting of Jean-Charles De Menezes
14 March 1991: release of the Birmingham Six  30 March 2006: adoption of 2006 Terrorism Act
26 June 1991: release of the Maguire Seven  2 June 2006: Forest Gate anti-terrorist Raid
23 September 1996: shooting of Diarmuid O’Neill 5 October 2006: Jack Straw veil controversy
10 April 1998: Good Friday Agreement  31 January 2007: Birmingham anti-terrorism raid
20 July 2000: adoption of Terrorism Act 2000
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3 Findings
3.1. Public Discourses 
Similarities and Differences between the two eras 
The two eras of political violence are frequently described as very different. Public perceptions of ‘Muslim 
terrorists’ are different in that they are seen as a global ideologically-motivated threat in a way that 
the IRA and Republicanism were not. Yet, our research shows that both counter-terrorism policies and 
the process of representing both sets of communities, in the press and political debate, are remarkably 
similar. This has produced negative effects across four decades for Irish communities and Muslim 
communities. 
• Terrorism remains a central security concern for the state and its response continues to be couched  
 within the notion of ‘emergency’ and ‘exceptionalism’, despite the apparent normalisation of terrorism 
 with the Terrorism Act 2000, through which counter- terrorism laws were made permanent, and  
 despite pressures for the respect of Human Rights. 
• In both eras political igures and journalists of all political orientations are at pains to distance   
 themselves and the institutions they belong to from such violence. This results in the deployment of  
 strong language, in the press and in political debate, with the perpetrators of violence described as  
 ‘evil’, ‘fanatics’ and ‘barbaric’, and many variations on these terms. 
• The society ‘under attack’ is represented as consisting of decent, civilised, law-abiding, moderate and  
 secular citizens and values.  
• In both eras, the press and policy study identiied a prevalent discourse of Britishness and of a uniied  
 nation in the face of the threat, with ‘us’ and ‘our’ people and values diametrically opposed to Irish and  
 Muslim ‘extremists’; Britishness is seen both as resilient, for instance through a vocabulary of war and  
 victory, and vulnerable to attack by ‘the enemy within’.
• There is frequent juxtaposition in the press, in political debate and in policy documents of ‘the   
 innocent Irish’ and ‘moderate Muslims’ with ‘Irish terrorists’ and ‘Muslim extremists’. This leads to the  
 ‘law-abiding’ always being deined in relation to ‘extremists’ and the blurring of boundaries between  
 them and the perpetrators of violence.
• One of the areas of strongest similarity in the public discourses in both eras is the ambiguous  
 representation of the communities, who are seen simultaneously as:
 o allies in the struggle against ‘extremists’
 o victims or potential victims of the terrorists’ violence and of potential backlash
 o under suspicion as they may be harbouring or supporting ‘extremists’
• It is in these ambiguous representations of Irish and Muslim communities, and in their construction as  
 separate, bounded communities (with varying degrees of ‘integration into British society’), that public 
 discourse has most impact on the lives of people identifying as Muslim and Irish and living in multi- 
 ethnic Britain. 
• Press coverage is not homogeneous in either era; there are variations which result from the political  
 orientation of the newspaper and its readership. Unsurprisingly there are differences between the 
 diaspora press and the national press, with the former more concerned with impacts on the   
 communities it addresses.
We identiied signiicant differences between the two eras resulting from different historical contexts: 
• The press study found 20% less coverage of Irish-related events, despite the far greater incidence of  
 actual physical violence perpetrated by the IRA (approximately 500 attacks in Britain over the years). 
• Even taking the increase in newspaper size in the period into account, this is a signiicant inding,  
 which suggests there was an effort to delegitimise threats to the integrity of the United Kingdom in  
 that period, and, in Margaret Thatcher’s words, to deprive ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. 
• Irish individuals and groups are represented as both a threat to security and to British values and  
 society, but the representation of a perceived threat to British values and, in particular, to British  
 culture is intensiied in relation to Muslims
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• Strikingly, with the notable exception of the 2005 London bombings, politically and culturally
 signiicant events (i.e. the fatwa 1989, the so-called ‘veil controversy’ 2006, the Good  Friday
 Agreement 1998) tend to attract more media coverage than enacted  violence. The extent of coverage  
 of the fatwa and the ‘veil controversy’ are  indicators of the representation of Islam as a threat to  
 British (and Western) values and culture. 
• Muslim women, as is particularly apparent from the ‘veil controversy’, are simultaneously perceived as  
 victims and as symbols of Muslim cultural difference.
• Political violence in both eras is associated with fanaticism and extremism. However, the policy study 
 found that allegedly Islamic political violence was associated with a coldly rational, and 
 incomprehensible ideology, whilst that of the IRA was portrayed more in terms of madness and  
 irrationality.
• Religion is an important feature of identiications and of tensions within both Irish communities and  
 Muslim communities. Nevertheless, faith traditions are not equally articulated in public discourse and  
 addressed in public policies: only in the case of Islam is religion identiied as the source of a potential  
 ideological threat. 
• Only in the current era of political violence have government responses incorporated religion as an 
 instrument in the ight against terrorism. This results in religious terms such as Islam and Muslim  
 being associated with terrorism in public discourse. 
3.2 Experiences, Interpretations and Impacts
Numerous similarities can be found in the experiences of those  affected by the discourses and policies 
we have analysed:
• Both Irish and Muslim participants suffered verbal and physical abuse in everyday encounters. The  
 similarities in the type of abuse experienced, included jokes about terrorism, being asked to speak for  
 Islam or Ireland, being called names in the street or even being directly accused of terrorism. Irish  
 people (identiied as Irish by their accent) were ignored or shunned at work or in shops or banks, while  
 Muslims recounted being stared at and shunned in the street or on public transport. 
• Many participants in the discussion groups felt that the media were in some way responsible for this  
 kind of response; they were particularly critical of the headlines of the tabloid press.
• The experience of discrimination while travelling internationally is common to both Irish and   
 Muslim respondents, who recounted incidents where they were subjected to extra or intrusive checks,  
 particularly at ports and airports. 
• There were some positive comments on the role of the police, but negative accounts were more  
 numerous. A third of the incidents recounted involved policing. Irish or Muslim spaces (mosques,  
 Catholic churches, Irish pubs) were felt to be under surveillance. Irish respondents recounted the  
 arrests of friends and family, while Muslim respondents recounted several instances of ‘stop and  
 search’ including onecase involving young children.
• The dominant response to this treatment was a state of fearfulness, which in turn resulted in
 behaviour such as lying low, keeping quiet, and avoiding certain places or areas of the city. This 
 provoked diverging reactions ranging from feelings of alienation, with implications for sense of   
 belonging and trust in institutions. to various forms of politicisation.
• Resilience and resistance were also central features of these accounts. Some interviewees   
 commented that Muslims were more assertive than Irish people had been in response to being treated  
 as suspect Their more conident public response can partly be attributed to the second generation  
 Muslims being oldernow than the equivalent Irish second generation were in the 1970s.
• Structural transformations in policy-making processes together with the long-term effects ofanti  
 discrimination policies have also enabled minority (especially Muslim) communities to assert their  
 voice within mainstream democratic processes to a degree that was not available to Irish  
 communities. 
• Some Muslim participants asserted their Britishness when faced with people treating them like  
 foreigners or outsiders; for many Irish respondents, particularly those born in Britain, the issue was  
 more how to be Irish in the face of both the stigmatisation of an identity tainted with ‘suspectness’  
 and the assumption that being white they must be English.
4
• Many Irish and Muslim respondents identiied strongly with the culturally, religiously and ethnically  
 diverse cities that they were living in. For many Muslim respondents the city represented a safer space  
 compared to the rest of Britain, in a way it had not been for Irish participants. 
• This pride in being part of these cities expressed itself in practices of multiculturalism. In the   
 discussion groups attempts were made to understand the experience of others and to build bridges. The  
 high level of trust established in some groups allowed people to recount quite disturbing experiences.  
 There was a consensus in all the groups that the comparison had been useful and beneicial. 
• Bringing Irish people together with Muslim people was also useful because the Irish participants spoke  
 about (and in fact where the actual embodiment of) the possibility of coming out from the category  
 of ‘suspect’, of becoming ‘normal’ again, of being rehabilitated as good citizens. This was an   
 important sign of hope, a reassuring factor for many Muslim participants. 
 
4 Conclusions
This is the irst comparative and historical project engaging simultaneously with two large ethnic 
and religious minorities in Britain who have been at the centre of security policy concerns for several 
decades. Our multi-level, and multi-disciplinary, approach has enabled us to contribute to the 
understanding of interconnected issues that are high on the agenda of policy makers in a number of 
sectors. 
We conclude that the representations and treatment of the Irish in the past have set a precedent for 
the treatment of Muslims in the current period. We have traced the way in which the reactions and 
responses to political violence in 1974 clearly had embedded within them the principles, and gave rise 
to, the prevention measures that have been practised on an even more systematic scale throughout the 
2000s. Despite anti-discrimination legislation, Muslim communities today are subjected to a similar 
process of construction as ‘suspect’ as Irish communities in the previous era. Few lessons appear to have 
been learnt from the period of ‘The Troubles’, despite the fact that those who were previously viliied are 
now part of the government in Northern Ireland with electoral support. 
The current government has stated that it seeks to separate the community cohesion agenda from the 
counter-terrorism agenda. This is useful but their location of the problem of political violence and the 
focus of counter-terrorism remains ixed on Muslim communities and a strategy of rooting out extreme 
ideas. This is a classic counter-insurgency strategy of the type that was unsuccessful in Northern Ireland. 
It is only likely to further reinforce the negative impacts on Muslims in Britain of counter-terrorism 
policies. It is also likely to further encourage the public at large, on this evidence, both to be more fearful 
(as it is rarely linked to any transparent assessment of risk) and therefore to treat Muslims as potential 
‘suspects’ or legitimate objects of abuse. 
Much of the policy attention has been directed towards to the supposed dificulty of managing diversity 
and Islamism. The empathetic connections established between participants in the discussion groups 
indicate the limitations of the community cohesion agenda with its identiication of separate and 
distinct ‘communities’ as the site of the problem of preventing political violence and as the site of 
strategies of social cohesion. The main counteracting force that we identiied to a categorisation of 
Muslims as potential ‘suspects’ lay in the cosmopolitanism that characterises places like London and 
Birmingham. The sympathetic exchanges in the discussion groups demonstrated this repeatedly. If 
discourses of ‘suspectness’ were not so widespread perhaps deeper connections would also develop with 
the majority ethnic group.
It appears from our research that a major concern for public authorities should be to ensure that security 
policies do not isolate and threaten communities and do not undermine their trust in state institutions 
and their sense of belonging. We have indicated that there are many more continuities between the two 
eras of political violence, particularly in counter-terrorism policies, than politicians and policy makers 
readily admit. A more successful policy would involve learning from this past
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5 Recommendations
• There should be more historical awareness of the relative effectiveness of past (and not just the  
 immediate, recent past) counter-terrorism measures, and of their consequences, when developing new  
 frameworks to counter-terrorism.
• Greater awareness of, and sensitivity to possible impacts on individuals and communities should  
 underpin the formulation of counter-terrorism policies.
• Greater awareness in and by the press and political establishment of the dangers of characterising  
 communities as ‘harbouring extremists’, as responsible for solving the problem of terrorism, or as split  
 between the innocent,law-abiding, moderate majority and the extremist, criminal minority, would help  
 to diminish the negative focus on Muslim communities..
• The conscious avoidance of extreme language and terminology such as ‘evil’, ‘perverse’, ‘barbaric’ and  
 so on, and particularly the association of these terms with Islam and Muslim/s (or any other group),  
 in the media, in political commentary and in policy documents would help to diminish the negative  
 impacts of such representations on Muslim communities. 
• Policies that foster the practices of multiculturalism based on less bounded notions of communities  
 may be more successful in promoting social cohesion within an increasingly ethnically, religiously and  
 culturally diverse society, than the focus on suspect communities as a source of and responsible for a  
 solution to political violence.
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1. Introduction
This comparative and historical project, covering the period 1974-2007, is focused on two eras 
of political violence in Britain. The irst coinciding with the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) bombing 
campaigns in England between 1973 and 1996, when the perpetrators were perceived as ‘Irish terrorists’. 
And the second since 2001, when, in Britain and elsewhere, the main threat of political violence has been 
portrayed as stemming from people allegedly motivated by extreme interpretations of Islam, and who 
are often labelled as ‘Islamic terrorists’.
The research examined to what extent and in what ways Irish communities and Muslim communities 
were represented as ‘suspect’ in public discourses in these two eras of political violence. It also examined 
the similarities and differences in the impact of both these representations and counter-terrorism 
measures on Muslim communities and Irish communities in Britain. 
The research provides a new analysis of Irish experiences and compares this with current Muslim 
experiences. The aim was to establish what useful insights this might afford both Muslim communities 
and policy makers who seek ways to implement counter-terrorism policies without alienating 
communities. 
Rationale and Aims
Our aim was to explore the implications for social cohesion of representing some groups as ‘suspect’ and 
the implications of counter-terrorism measures for the everyday lives of Irish communities and Muslim 
communities. This research report considers how the practice of conceiving of groups within civil society 
as ‘communities’ (eg. Home Ofice 2001) meshes with the conceptualising of certain populations as 
‘suspect’. It analyses how this impacts on social cohesion and exerts constraints not only on members of 
these communities in Britain but also on the population as a whole. 
The IRA’s campaign in England caused over 500 incidents between 1973 and 1996 and focused on both 
military/police and civilian targets (English 2006). A landmark in this campaign of political violence 
was the bombing of two pubs in Birmingham, on 21 November 1974, when 21 people were killed and 
over 180 were injured. Although earlier attacks had taken place that year in other locations, including 
Woolwich and Guildford, the Birmingham occurrence was the bloodiest event and the trigger that led 
Parliament to pass draconian anti-terrorism measures applicable in Britain, akin to those already in force 
in Northern Ireland. Over the next quarter of a century the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary 
provisions) 1974 (PTA) was reviewed and renewed regularly until it became the foundation of permanent 
law with the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000 and its subsequent amendments.
Starting at the end of the 1990s, British counter-terrorism measures became increasingly tightened and 
focused on Muslim communities, as the idea of ‘religious terrorism’ and ‘extremist Islamism’ permeated 
policy communities and as the threat of Irish republicanism retreated (Lloyd 1996; Rowe 1997; Straw 
1999; Terrorism Act 2000). This process accelerated in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 
2001, which triggered the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and especially after the London bombings of July 2005, which in turn 
led to the Terrorism Act 2006 and the ‘Prevent’ agenda (DCLG 2007). 
Methods
The analysis of public discourses was based on the following data:
• Government statements, strategic papers and political speeches as well as parliamentary debates at 
 key moments between 1974 and 2007. We examined parliamentary debate and documents produced  
 by relevant ministries and agencies (e.g. Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Home Ofice; Police; 
 Commission for Racial Equality), as well as Royal Commissions of Inquiry, independent reviews,   
 statutory bodies, and local authorities. We analysed speeches and programmatic statements, strategic  
 papers, commissioned research and command papers, Parliamentary committee reports and minutes:  
 over 800 sets of policy documents produced between 1974 and 2007. 
• National and diaspora press coverage of 19 key events between 1974 and 2007. Our study evaluated  
 representations of Irish communities and Muslim communities in the national press (Daily Mail, Mail  
 on Sunday, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, Observer, Sun, News of the World) and in the  
 diaspora press (Asian Times, Irish Post, Muslim News) - a total of 2,798 news items.
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The investigation of the experiences of Irish and Muslim communities was implemented through:
• 42 key informant interviews with leaders of community and faith-based organisations; human rights  
 activists; individuals who had been wrongly imprisoned or arrested; journalists, politicians and lawyers  
 who had some involvement with the communities or community members during the period under  
 study.
• Seven mixed Irish and Muslim discussion groups (three in Birmingham, four in London): a total of 38  
 people (19 identifying as Irish, 19 as Muslim) participated in these events. 
(see full description of the research methods used in the Appendix).
2. Reasons for the comparison
The two eras of political violence we examined are frequently described as very different and this has, in 
particular, been used to justify the passage of a series of further counter-terrorism measures during the 
2000s. There are three main reasons why the eras are seen as distinctive:
• The current political violence is said to be motivated by ideology in a way the IRA were not
• The methods used in the current phase of political violence are described as more indiscriminate,  
 including ‘suicide’ bombers
• The ‘Irish’ threat was viewed ultimately as negotiable compared with what is viewed as the absence of  
 concrete demands of current perpetrators of violence
There are, however, ive ways in which the commonalities of the two eras are striking: 
• The main counter-terrorism measures employed today stem directly from the period of IRA violence
• The experiences of many Irish and Muslims both at the hands of the police and in their everyday lives  
 are similar
• Both these populations result from post-1945 migrations in the 1950s and 1960s, plus their children  
 and grandchildren; and of subsequent signiicant immigrations of both Irish and Muslims since the  
 1980s
• Both Irish communities and Muslim communities form part of the complex cultural, religious and  
 ethnic pluralism that characterises Britain’s urban space
• The religious dimension constitutes both a similarity and a difference in the experiences of the two  
 sets of communities: although in both religion can be an important dimension of identity, it is only  
 perceived as an ideological motive in relation to Muslim communities in Britain
Our research challenges the oficial discourse of discontinuities between the two eras. There are 
also many reasons to compare the contemporary context with events in Northern Ireland between 
1968 and 1998. However, others have already contributed to this discussion (see Hillyard 2005 and 
McGovern 2010) and we wished to concentrate on Britain where debates about ‘community cohesion’ 
and Britishness have been actively engaged throughout the past decade, with a particular resonance in 
England.
There has been no previous systematic research exploring the parallels and differences between these 
two eras of political violence in terms of the experiences of these two sets of communities and the 
implications across four decades for social cohesion and for effective security. 
Key informants’ view of the comparison
We asked our key informants what they thought about the validity of making the comparison. Here are 
some of their responses:
  I think there are deinitely beneits, we need to actually learn from our mistakes and we need 
  to actually build up on our achievements. And if you look at the Irish experience that could  
  be done. We will surely come to the situation that we need to deal with criminality rather   
  than communities. And criminalities and communities are separate. You can never associate the  
  whole community with a particular criminality - we need to create a society in which everybody  
  is a stakeholder (Chair of an Islamic organisation)
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I am not sure how many beneits there are in making a comparison. I think we will know that 
when you’ve inished your study. (Member of the House of Lords)
… it’s possible that some people in the Muslim community may feel very marginalised and 
may feel that the rest of society is suspicious of them but they don’t want to be in that role 
particularly, they just want to get on with their life and be part of society. They may ind it very 
interesting and a bit of a support to hear in some detail that another community went, another 
community who are now thought of as being part of the main, the majority society, actually went 
through a period of a hundred years or so when they went through something very, very similar. 
(Chair of a Catholic organisation)
… the Irish community originally were [suspect] and it would be interesting to see how we’ve 
developed that now since the Seventies and how we’ve moved on and how they feel at the 
moment… Are those same practices that were developed in the Seventies is that the same thing 
we are now doing to a different community. And that comparison would be interesting and good 
research. Not only is it research that the government should be looking at but locally, local forces 
should be looking at and maybe there’s lessons that we can learn … something which we can 
learn about change and adopting different methods of improving that engagement and how we 
go about dealing with people. (A counter-terrorist oficer in the police force in Birmingham)
I think there is beneit in the sense that you don’t feel so vulnerable and you feel that there other 
communities who suffered more or less if not that severe but at least suffered like you. And it 
helps you in recovering from internal despondency. And also, also it teaches us that what were the 
causes of the IRA crisis, Irish crisis, there was political will of solving this. I think this [the research] 
will be useful in giving young Muslims perspective of where to stand because many of them don’t 
have that much knowledge in how a white community, if I can use this word, suffered similar sort 
of discrimination and suspicion by the society. (Chair of a Muslim organisation)
People who would be upset about your notion (of suspect communities) would be people who 
have just lost sight of human empathy and what it and just are lacking in suficient experience or 
imagination to understand what it must have felt like to have an Irish accent in Central London in 
the 1970s or what it might have felt like to be a young Asian man getting on a tube train a few 
days after 7/7, for example. … I think it would be useful to have something which using the Irish 
example and would help us look at where it went wrong and what were the big mistakes so we 
can avoid making them - But also what went right, you know. How, how was signiicant progress 
made to take a community from being suspect to now. (Director, Civil Liberties organisation)
I think from what I understand from this is that it’s like erm [pauses] just sort of the assumption 
that like the Irish were all supportive of the IRA activities and that Muslims are all supportive of 
this terrorism that’s going on at the moment in, you know, the 7/7 [sic] and that. And that there 
is probably just a very small minority of people, the same as with the Irish, that sort of like pro 
those. And that is somehow or other to erm, get that message across, you know, that’s not the 
view of all … the IRA and that, okay they did a lot of bombing and nobody could say that in the 
end they had to sit down, they had to talk and things are better now and I think they probably 
need to do the same. (Irish woman, retired from NGO position)
I think enormous, I think there are enormous beneits because one of the battles that Muslims are 
facing in the present state is for, I think for society to recognise the continuities in a lot of things 
that Muslims are currently experiencing. Continuities in terms of demonisation of communities. 
Continuities in terms of threat to national security. Continuities in terms of the way legislative 
reactions have sometimes only fostered further dificulties in terms of grappling with some of the 
problems we are facing, in terms of knee jerk reactions or, you know, harsh legislation. (Member of 
a Muslim women’s organisation)
Generally the response was that the comparison would: enhance mutual communication; encourage 
lessons to be learnt from one era to the other as many felt there had not been enough lessons learnt 
from the Irish experience; demonstrate that all terrorists are not Muslims; open eyes on what a white 
group experienced and bring minority perspectives to the fore. It was also hoped that the broader focus 
of this project (compared with much current research which is focused on extremism) would inform 
policy by providing a richer contextualisation of the issues.
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3. Notions of ‘Suspect Communities’
The notion of ‘suspect community’ irst appeared in Paddy Hillyard’s (1993) work on the growth of the 
‘secret state’ and the effects of the PTA. His study of the application of the PTA focused on individuals at 
the receiving end of these measures and included interviews with people examined, detained or arrested 
in England, Wales and Scotland between 1978 and 1991. 
Hillyard explained the concept of ‘suspect community’ as the process of identiication of a threat and 
of a sign of abnormality which exempliied and legitimated the politics of exception put in place by the 
state:
  ‘a person who is drawn into the criminal justice system under the PTA is not a suspect in the  
  normal sense of the word. In other words, they are not believed to be involved in or guilty of  
  some illegal act […] people are suspect primarily because they are Irish and once they are in the 
  police station they are often labelled an Irish suspect, presumably as part of some classiication  
  system. In practice, they are being held because they belong to a suspect community’ (Hillyard  
  1993: 7)
  ‘In attempting to prevent the spread of political violence to Britain, anyone living in Ireland  
  as well as anyone with an Irish background living in England can be seen as falling within a  
  category of people who may legitimately be stopped. The Irish community as a whole can   
  therefore be legally viewed as a suspect community. (Hillyard 1993: 33).
An example of this was the arrest and subsequent imprisonment in 1976 of the Maguire Seven. The 
seven family members including two children were tried and convicted for a crime that not only had 
none of them committed but also had not been committed in the irst place: participation in running 
an alleged IRA bomb factory in their west London home. For this non-crime the family were sentenced 
between them to 73 years in prison. 
In our research we incorporate Hillyard’s concept but not his approach – in that we were not primarily 
interested in people who were detained or arrested but about the impact on people going about their 
everyday lives. We take from his analysis, however, that to be considered a ‘suspect’ is unrelated to a real 
offence. Yet, whoever falls into this category de facto becomes a ‘suspected terrorist’. This can have long 
term consequences for the psychological well-being of the individual and for his/her family and friends. 
It is important to investigate how ‘suspectiication’ works. While initiated by the authorities, the process 
of detecting ‘suspect’ individuals and behaviours can gradually expand and be reproduced by a range of 
people and social groups, including the media, the general public, and even members of the communities 
under suspicion. 
In this report we concentrate on the main indings in relation to four of our research questions:
•  How is a community constructed as ‘suspect’ in public discourse (government and media) and through  
 the implementation of counter-terrorism measures?
•  What differences and similarities are there in the construction and representation of Irish and Muslims  
 as ‘suspect’ communities? What symbolic and discursive continuities and discontinuities are there in  
 relation to both sets of communities?
•  What impacts do representations of being ‘suspect’ and counter-terrorism measures have for the  
 everyday experiences and sense of belonging of members of these communities?
•  How do these constructions and representations of ‘suspect’ communities inform reconigurations and  
 representations of Britishness? 
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4. FINDINGS - Public Discourses 
4.1 Policy Study
Oficial policy documents offer one important dimension of public discourses, not only because they 
represent the voice of state institutions and of those holding authoritative positions, but also because 
they produce policy actions, which then impact directly onto people, who in turn may engage with and 
contest such discourses.
This policy study traces the evolution of the British establishment’s characterisations of terrorism 
and suspectness in relation to the two eras of political violence. Discourses of suspicion are central to 
the anti-terrorism measures of the last four decades in Britain. Rather than being based on a precise 
offence, they proceed along a logic of association, thus identifying as security threats markers of identity 
and behaviours that are speciic to particular social groups, which could potentially become ‘suspect 
communities’. 
We have sought to unpack the elements and attributes associated with what is identiied as a terrorist 
threat and thus as designating a ‘suspect’, and to ascertain whether these terms have been associated 
with Irish and with Muslim communities. 
Examining the terms through which security threats are identiied and acted upon enabled us to identify 
transformations and continuities in policy-making processes, as well as visions about national unity, 
competing understandings of security and freedoms, and the position of ethnic and religious minorities 
in a democratic society characterised by religious diversity, large immigration lows, and continuing 
episodes of political violence.
As an example of this exercise, here we present extracts from our comparison of the reactions and 
responses to the bombings of 21 November 1974 in Birmingham and of 7 July 2005 in London. 
Characterisations of the threat in two eras of political violence
‘Extremism’ is commonly used in the present to deine actions and people associated with political 
violence, and especially with Islamism:
  ‘It’s important however that those engaged in terrorism realise that our determination to defend  
  our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction  
  to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world’ (Blair, 7/7/2005)
  ‘After all, extremism is not conined to Muslims, as we know from Northern Ireland and fringe  
  elements in many ethnic groups. But actually what should give us optimism in dealing with this  
  issue, is precisely that point. It is true there are extremists in other communities. But the reason  
  we are having this debate is not generalised extremism. It is a new and virulent form of ideology  
  associated with a minority of our Muslim community’ (Blair 2006).
However, in 1974, and roughly up to the early 1980s, ‘extremist’ does not appear to be a major qualiier 
designating terrorism. When it is (rarely) used, it refers to the extremists associated with various groups, 
and qualiies their extreme tactics, not their political claims. The perpetrators of attacks in Britain were 
rarely openly identiied as ‘the IRA’ but were portrayed as mindless ‘criminals’ and ‘fanatics’, as a ‘lunatic 
fringe’ (Thierney, Hansard, 25/11/1974; Bennett, Hansard, 11/12/1974) engaged in ‘insensate’ acts 
(Jenkins, Hansard, 22/11/1974), as ‘evil men who are beyond reasoning’ (Johnston, Hansard, 19/12/1983). 
While ‘murderers are seldom rational people’ (Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Hansard, 22/11/1974), the state 
needs to respond rationally, but irmly, emphasised the Home Ofice minister just before introducing 
the PTA 1974: ‘We want a rational response, and I believe that the response I am giving, whilst an urgent 
response, is also rational’ (Jenkins, Hansard, 22/11/1974). 
When the IRA planted bombs in Britain, their political claims were omitted or downplayed in the 
establishment’s reactions, and Northern Ireland featured as something relatively remote. It seems that 
anonymising the IRA and associating it with irrationality was a method to discredit and weaken any 
credence that might be given to its political agenda. A constant dichotomy was therefore sustained 
between the irrationality of, in particular, the IRA, and the rationality of the state and its actions. 
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In 2005 the perpetrators of violence were perceived as ‘evil’ too, but in a different sense. They were no 
longer described as insane but as rational actors carefully planning and calculating their actions, as these 
excerpts show:
  ‘This morning’s explosions were acts of almost unspeakable depravity and wickedness, planned  
  with the deliberate intention of taking innocent life, and the whole House condemns them  
  utterly. This is an attack not just on our capital city, but on our country and our way of life as a  
  whole’ (Davis, Hansard, 7/7/2005).
  ‘The greatest danger is that we fail to face up to the nature of the threat we are dealing with.  
  What we witnessed in London last Thursday week was not an aberrant act. It was not random.  
  It was not a product of particular local circumstances in West Yorkshire. … Senseless though  
  any such horrible murder is, it was not without sense for its organisers. It had a purpose. It was  
  done according to a plan. It was meant 
  […] (Blair, 16/07/2005).
The binary opposition between the evil and wickedness of the perpetrators and the innocence of the 
civilian victims is another component of the narrative of both eras. For instance, the language utilised 
immediately after the November 1974 attacks can easily be compared, and indeed interchanged, with 
that of July 2005:
  ‘… the deepest anger that a tiny minority of fanatics should be able to inlict appalling suffering  
  and loss on innocent people, and in doing so, should be doing damage to our whole society’ (Lord  
  Chancellor, Hansard, (28/11/1974).
  ‘… they are trying to use the slaughter of innocent people to cow us, to frighten us out of doing  
  the things we want to do, of trying to stop us going about our business as normal as we are  
  entitled to do and they should not and must not succeed’ (Blair 07/07/2005).
In the post 7 July 2005 context, the words extremism, ideology, evil and Islamism are frequently 
repeated and become almost intertwined, as exempliied by this speech by Tony Blair one week later:
  ‘What we are confronting here is an evil ideology […]  
  And, of course, they will use any issue that is a matter of dissent within our democracy. But we  
  should lay bare the almost-devilish logic behind such manipulation […] 
  This is a religious ideology, a strain within the world-wide religion of Islam, as far removed  
  from its essential decency and truth as Protestant gunmen who kill Catholics or vice versa, are  
  from Christianity’ (16/07/2005).
These ideas had become consolidated in previous years as other policy documents demonstrate 
(Rowe 1997; Straw 1999; Blunkett 2003; Blair 2004; and as discussed by Rehman 2007). Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that there is a convergence among politicians of different orientations in espousing 
this view of the threat and its nature. For instance, Conservative MP Michael Howard praised British 
‘citizens’ and the British ‘way of life’ for proving ‘once again resilient in the face of evil’ and the terrorists’ 
‘warped ideology’ (Hansard, 11/07/2005).
Another recurring theme present in both eras is ‘barbarism’. This term is associated with a moral and 
cultural metaphorical struggle for the values of civility which is evident in the offsetting of, on the 
one hand, ‘terrorists’ and, on the other, ‘civilised people’ and ‘those Muslims who represent ‘the decent, 
humane and principled faith of Islam’ (Blair, 27/09/2005). A similar idea was conveyed in the previous 
decades by references to the animal violence and loss of human quality of the ‘bestial bombers’ (Lord 
Hunt, Hansard, 28/11/1974; cf. Lord Hailsham of Saint-Mary-Lebone, Hansard, 28/11/1974). The linked 
idea of disorder was also conveyed by references to bestiality and barbarism, as well as by the metaphors 
‘scourge’ and ‘plague’ utilised by various politicians to describe IRA attacks in the 1980s (Pitt, Hansard, 
20/07/1982; Lord Belstead, Hansard, 27/10/1981; Grifith, Hansard, 19/12/1983).
Shortly before the attacks of 21 November 1974 the IRA had openly declared itself at war with the 
government of the United Kingdom. Rather than rejecting this notion, the semantic ield of war was 
repeatedly summoned up in many of these early Parliamentary debates:
  ‘Is it not right to recognise that this event is another act in the ruthless war of aggression which  
  is being waged against the United Kingdom and its integrity, a war of which the brunt has   
  mainly been borne for over ive years past by our fellow subjects in Northern Ireland’  
  (Powell, Hansard, 22/11/1974).
  ‘This is a war we have to win. Our duty is to wage it without sacriicing the ideals which make it  
  worth while winning’ (Lord Hailsham of Saint Mary-Lebone, Hansard, 28/11/1974).
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The same idea was also implicit in the use of the expressions ‘victory’, ‘submission’ and ‘will to win’ by 
former Home Affairs Secretary Roy Jenkins (22/11/1974).
Forty-one years later similar remarks were made by former Defence Secretary John Reid:
  ‘I am also sure that all of us will want to express our utter condemnation of those responsible for  
  today’s attacks. We must ensure that they understand that they will not win in their attempt to  
  break our will or undermine our democratic response to today’s events’ Hansard, 7/7/2005)
and by a powerful statement of former Prime Minister Tony Blair:
  ‘it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both within Islam and outside it.
  This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but their views.  
  Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. Not only what they do but what they think  
  and the thinking they would impose on others. 
  […] We must be clear about how we win this struggle’ (Blair, 16/07/2005).
The repetitious use of terms evoking war: ‘struggle’, ‘battle’, ‘won’, ‘confront’ is compelling. The notion 
of a war-like confrontation with the perpetrators of violence appears to be a constant feature of British 
and American thinking on counter-insurgency, according to which political dissent brings disequilibrium 
to the given social order and to the legitimacy of the state. From this perspective, ‘no political activity 
can be above suspicion’ (Schlesinger 1991:76) and counter-insurgency becomes a systemic approach 
involving all ‘theatres of action’ (Kilcullen 2004).
The feeling left by both events, regardless of the executants’ ideologies and slogans, was that Britain 
was under attack and that national values and national unity were under threat, people were inevitably 
fearful. In both periods the response was that the nation would resist and stand united. Pride in the 
British qualities of ‘resilience’ and orderliness is expressed:
  ‘even at moments of shock and emotion as great as that of the present time it is important that  
  we should remain rational and calm, and not respond too hastily’. (Jenkins, Hansard, 22/11/1974).
  ‘the community as a whole, in my opinion, should seek to respond to these events in a calm and  
  considered way’ (Clarke, Hansard, 7/7/2005)
  ‘the British people will not be cowed and the terrorists will not win’ (Davis, Hansard, 7/7/2005).
The tone of these statements resonates with responses to earlier atrocities, such as Brittan’s call 
(Hansard, 19/12/1983), after the Harrods bombings in 1983, to be ‘united’ and ‘stand irm against the 
evil men’, without making ‘concessions to the bullet and the bomb’. Resilience was also the key theme 
of a Home Ofice (1999) document providing advice to the business sector faced with the potential 
threat of terrorism even after the Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998. The Mayor of London’s speech, 
after the ‘cowardly attacks’ of July 2005, was well-received, with his appeal to the ‘harmony’, ‘unity’, 
and ‘solidarity’ of a capital city that prides itself on its cultural and religious diversity (Livingstone 
07/07/2005). 
In summary, while differing in ideology and strategy, all the attacks caused similar levels of fear and 
despair. Policy-makers responded demonstrating equal levels of shock and disgust but also irmly 
condemning the ‘barbaric’ and ‘murderous’ occurrences and promising a prompt, adequate, rational and 
balanced response. 
This indicates that, whenever national security was at stake in the period under investigation, the 
government and parliament in ofice shared a common self-understanding and appreciation of the role 
of state institutions, of the national interest, and of the control of violence. The urgent sense of risk and 
responsibility resulted in the passage of illiberal emergency measures couched in arcane references to a 
battle between good and evil. Despite divergences in political and ideological afiliation and the variable 
of time, Labour and Conservative governments similarly endorsed ‘extreme’ emergency measures in 
order to ight the ‘extreme’ methods of the terrorists. This constitutes a major line of continuity in public 
discourse over the four decades.
The establishment stressed the abnormality of those engaged in political violence through a binary 
taxonomy between an idealised version of British values and symbols and two extreme opposites; 
the ‘madness’ and irrationality of the ‘Irish threat’ in the past, and the evil rationality of a faith-based 
ideology in the 21st century. Both rhetorical strategies have the effect of de-politicising and de-
legitimising the claims of those engaged in violence as well as in broader forms of dissent (cf. Schlesinger 
1991). 
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Representations of Irish communities and Muslim communities
The ambiguous position of Irish and Muslims – as victims, partners and threats – became clear in the 
analysis. In both eras the minority ethnic/religious communities who are perceived to be associated with 
the violence are characterised: as allies in the struggle against ‘terrorism’, as victims needing protection 
from a potential backlash and as communities that might be harbouring extremists and threatening 
individuals:
  ‘I have represented for nearly 25 years the city of Birmingham, which has a large Irish community  
  of about 100,000. During the whole of that period relations have been excellent between that  
  community and the native-born population. It would be a tragedy if these relations were   
  damaged by what has been done by a tiny majority. It is of great importance that we should  
  recognise how utterly alien and repugnant to the overwhelming majority of the Irish is what  
  is being done by a few totally unrepresentative fringe igures of their community’  
  (Jenkins, Hansard, 22/11/1974)
  ‘We must not […] condone retaliation upon the broad mass of our neighbours in this country who  
  may be of Irish extraction—as indeed I am myself—for the wicked deeds of a guilty minority of  
  which the enormous majority are wholly innocent’ (Lord Hailsham, Hansard, 28/11/1974).
  ‘I endorse the sincere hope that Irishmen in this country as a whole will not be blamed in any way  
  for the actions of the criminals’ (Lord Janner, Hansard, 28/11/1974).
  ‘We stand united against the perpetrators of those evil, barbaric acts of terrorism. Can he [the  
  PM] assure me that the Government recognise that the overwhelming majority of the Muslims  
  who live in this country are tolerant, law-abiding citizens who respect other religions and do not  
  support terrorism? Can he assure me that the Government will do everything they can to prevent  
  any backlash against Muslims?’ (Sarwar, Hansard, 11/07/2005).
  ‘Muslims, like all of us, abhor terrorism. Like all of us, are its victims’ (Blair, 27/09/2005).
The parallel emphasis on the innocence of the mainstream Irish and Muslim population is worthy 
of note. Although on both occasions the minorities are seen as part of the ‘injured’ side, each time 
emergency counter-terrorism policies then evolved in a way that targeted and negatively affected these 
minorities: the 1974 measures developed explicitly against ‘Irish’ terrorism; the Terrorism Act of 2000 
included the notion of ‘religious’ motivation for terrorism and proscribed several Muslim organisations. 
The subsequent laws of 2001, 2005, and 2006 expanded the offence of terrorism in a way that meant 
anything remotely associated with Islam and possible dissent became the object of suspicion. This has 
parallels with the establishment’s perception of Irish communities in the 1990s:
  ‘the defeat of terrorism also requires the whole-hearted co-operation of the vast majority of law- 
  abiding Irish men and women’ (Hattersley, Hansard, 06/03/1990)
  ‘the public should be totally aware that these terrorists are in their midst, and suspicious   
  activities of any kind such as Irish people hiring cars, booking short-term stays in guest houses,  
  using lock-up garages for short periods at a time, and so on, must be reported to the police.  
  Harassment pays, and although some innocents may be perturbed and affected, chasing the  
  terrorists will certainly pay. On the whole they have been harassed and chased out of Northern  
  Ireland. Now that they are here, we have to do the same in Great Britain’.  
  (Lord Mason of Barnsley, 26/06/1990)
  ‘And I say to our Muslim community. People know full well that the overwhelming majority of 
  Muslims stand four square with every other community in Britain. We were proud of your   
  contribution to Britain before last Thursday. We remain proud of it today. Fanaticism is not a state  
  of religion but a state of mind. We will work with you to make the moderate and true voice of  
  Islam heard as it should be’ (Blair, Hansard, 11/07/2005).
  ‘… we want to work with the Muslim community to isolate and weaken dangerous extremists’  
  (Clarke 20/07/2005).
These extracts show how Irish communities and Muslim communities found themselves situated in an 
ambiguous position, both as a consequence of the political violence and of the anti-terrorism measures. 
Whether pointing openly to the ‘enemy within’ or calling for the cooperation of the ‘moderate’ and ‘law-
abiding’ members of these communities in order to eradicate extremism, the implicit message of the 
establishment seems to be that they have become ‘suspect communities’. 
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Numerous policy documents actually explain that the emergence of extremists or terrorists from 
certain minority communities should not lead to the conclusion that those communities are also guilty. 
However, these apparently nuanced statements are not necessarily matched by equivalent practices; 
the way in which counter-terrorism policies are conducted, implemented and how they impact on the 
populations in question suggests the opposite. 
The continuation of draconian anti-terrorism measures and the development of the idea of prevention, 
accompanied by a range of policies loosely connected with counter-terrorism, led to an excessive 
focus on these communities. This gave them an ambiguous status of victims and partners with an 
aura of suspicion. The positioning of the Muslim communities is however different from that of Irish 
communities in the past, in that societal transformations (e.g. the Rushdie affair, 9/11, the 2006 veil 
debate, continuing though diversiied immigrations into Britain) and policy evolutions beyond the 
domain of counter-terrorism,1 have altered the position, both the dificulties (e.g. exposure to stop and 
search) and the opportunities, that are available for minorities in Britain today.
4.2 Media Study
Mapping analysis of headlines in the press
Our analysis shows that the British press participates in the construction of Irish and Muslim 
communities as ‘suspect’ to varying degrees and in divergent ways. For instance, we found 20% less 
coverage of Irish-related events, despite the far greater incidence of actual physical violence perpetrated 
by the IRA. Even taking the increase in newspaper size in the period into account, this is a signiicant 
inding, which suggests that there was an effort to minimise threats to the integrity of the United 
Kingdom, and, in Margaret Thatcher’s words, to deprive ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ in this 
period. The tendency to invisibilise and incorporate the Irish in Britain (Hickman, 1998), the climate of 
media censorship, with the Broadcasting Ban enforced between 1988 and 1994, and the strategy of 
depoliticising the struggle for a united Ireland (such as the withdrawal of Special Category Status for 
convicted paramilitary prisoners in 1976) may all have contributed to this phenomenon.
Table 1 – The Complete Sample 1974-2007
Note: DM & MoS: Daily Mail & Mail on Sunday; DT & ST: Daily Telegraph & Sunday Telegraph; G &O: Guardian & 
Observer; S & N: Sun & News of the World; AT: Asian Times; IP: Irish Post; MN: Muslim News.
1 For instance in race relations; religious discrimination; the inclusion in the census of the categories of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’, respectively in 
1991 and 2001; the creation of new areas of ministerial competence, such as Communities and Local Government; the evolution of a culture 
of open consultation with stakeholders; parliamentary reforms, such as the inclusion of nominated peers in the House of Lords that come from 
ethnic minorities.
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As well as mapping the amount of coverage of each event, we also analysed headlines. These are 
particularly signiicant because of their probable impact on readers: ‘skilled newspaper readers spend 
most of their reading time scanning the headlines – rather than reading the stories’ (Dor, 2003: 696).  
Table 2: Top 20 terms used in the headlines of Irish- and Muslim-related key events, 1974 - 2007
  
    Irish-related terms N Muslim-related terms N
  1  PEACE   132 POLICE   204
  2  IRA   124 TERROR   170
  3  ULSTER   107 RUSHDIE  100
  4  SIX   72 MUSLIM   99
  5  BOMB   71 BLAIR (Sir Ian)  95
  6  POLICE   69 VEIL   94
  7  BLAIR (Tony)  66 MUSLIMS  79
  8  BIRMINGHAM  59 LONDON  72
  9  DEAL   51 RACE   67
  10 YES   47 BRITAIN   62
  11 IRELAND  43 ATTACK   57
  12 IRISH   40 BILL   48
  13 SINN FEIN  39 OUR   48
  14 VOTE   39 CHIEF   47
  15 FOUR   37 MET   46
  16 JUSTICE   34 STRAW   46
  17 GUILDFORD  33 RIOTS   45
  18 TERROR   30 DAY   44
  19 VICTIMS   30 RIOT   44
  20 RELEASE   29 US   44
POLICE and TERROR are the only words used in the top 20s of both sets of news items, albeit with 
greatly varying frequencies. POLICE (204) is the most frequently used word in Muslim-related headlines, 
with associated terms such as (Sir Ian) BLAIR (95), MET (i.e. London Metropolitan Police, 46) and CHIEF 
(47) also iguring prominently. In contrast, POLICE appears 69 times in Irish-related headlines. This 
difference is striking when considering that the modus operandi of the police was questioned intensively 
in the press in the aftermath of the releases of the Guildford Four and Birmingham Six, just as it was 
after the De Menezes shooting and after the botched terror raids in Forest Gate and Birmingham. 
Although we identiied scrutiny of the security apparatus in our sample of Irish-related events, this 
scrutiny is more intensive in the recent period of Muslim-related events. While large sections within the 
press were initially uncritical of police operations targeting alleged Irish terrorist suspects, this attitude 
changed with the release of wrongfully arrested people on the basis of unsafe forensic evidence in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. When compared with coverage of Irish-related events, the press  are quicker 
to criticize the state security apparatus in its reporting of Muslim-related events, adopting a more 
guarded stance when covering anti-terrorist operations. This may also have been inluenced by a number 
of factors, such as the publication of the Macpherson (1999) Report in 1999 on the enquiry into the 
death of Stephen Lawrence, and the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998.
It is signiicant that whereas the terms MUSLIM/S, ISLAM and ISLAMIC recur frequently, al-Qaeda is 
mentioned only twice. On the contrary, the term ‘IRA’ is used more frequently than ‘Irish’. The headlines 
suggest that whereas terrorism is associated with Muslims in general, the IRA is targeted more 
speciically. Nonetheless, the IRA (the Irish Republican Army) will inevitably become associated with, and 
relect on, Irish communities as a whole, as our Irish respondents’ comments attest (see below). 
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With the notable exception of the July 2005 bombings, politically and culturally signiicant events in our 
sample - that is, the fatwa (1989), so-called ‘veil controversy’ (2006) and the Good Friday Agreement 
(1998) - tend to attract more coverage than enacted violence. Whilst in the case of the Good Friday 
agreement this is not surprising, given its historical signiicance, the extent of coverage of the fatwa and 
the ‘veil controversy’ indicates how the press participates in the construction of Muslims and Islam as 
a cultural threat. The media attention to the ‘veil controversy’ also demonstrates the symbolic role of 
‘woman’ in the construction of national identity (Yuval-Davies, 1997; Meer, Dyer and Modood, 2010), 
and the requirement for women’s social compliance to be demonstrated through reassuring facial 
expressions and modes of dress in western modernity.
The extensive coverage of the Muslim-related events, the focus on political and cultural issues, as well 
as the massive amount of coverage of the July bombings (which encompassed a questioning of the 
place of Islam and Muslims in Britain) imply a deeply rooted and prevalent construction of Muslims 
as threatening in the British press (see Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006). Irish individuals 
and groups are represented as both a threat to security and to British values and society, but the 
representation of a perceived threat to British values and, in particular, to British culture is intensiied in 
relation to Muslims (see also Ansari 2004). This connects, of course, with the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis 
(Huntington 1993) often referred to after September 11th, 2001, with Islam representing a threatening 
‘Other’ to Western cultures as a whole (see Poole 2006). Despite this intense focus on Muslims in the 
contemporary period, we identify continuities in discourse across the two eras, which we discuss below.  
Detailed analysis of content in the press
The second stage of the media study consisted of the detailed analysis of a sample of articles. This 
analysis indicates that Irish communities in Britain are associated with discourses which are taken up 
later, and indeed dominate, in coverage of Muslim-related events. 
In both cases the press across the board is at pains to distinguish between the law-abiding, decent 
majority and the violent minority, and there is a recurrent binary opposition of these two constructions. 
The ‘innocent Irish’ are contrasted with those belonging to or sympathising with the IRA and other 
paramilitaries (including their political representatives), or with religious bigots:
  ‘Recently a social report on Glasgow said that the inlux of Irish immigrants into the area 70  
  years ago had created “an abyss of religious bigotry … an abyss which is still wide and has jagged,  
  cruel edges to it”’ (‘The Irish in our midst’, The Sunday Telegraph, 1 December, 1974, p.5). 
Similarly, the opposite of the moderate Muslim is usually described as an extremist, a radical or a terrorist. 
In some oppositions of ‘Muslim extremism’ and moderate Muslims, violent terms such as ‘poison’ 
‘venom’, ‘evil’, or ‘perverse’ are used to characterise the former: ‘They (the British people) want their 
Muslim neighbours – the great majority of whom are decent, patriotic and law-abiding – actively to help 
ind an antidote to the poison in our midst’ (‘How do we deal with this poison in our midst?’, The Daily 
Mail, August 3 2005, p. 12).  Whilst in general religion is less foregrounded in the Irish-related coverage, 
the discourse of ‘religious bigotry’ found in some articles is similar to the later focus on some Imams as 
‘preachers of hate’. 
In this context, it must be noted that the mere fact of referring to the innocent Irish implicitly constructs 
the Irish as a potential threat, and contains an inbuilt presumption that while many are innocent, others 
are guilty. There is a clear parallel between the innocent Irish and moderate Muslims, a phrase that 
also implicitly suggests that some Muslims are not moderate but extremist and therefore dangerous. 
Although these phrases themselves appear innocuous, or even positive, in fact they participate in the 
construction of Irish communities and Muslim communities as harbouring, or potentially harbouring, 
extremists, terrorists or criminals, that is, as a danger to society.
The idea of an enemy hidden within the communities, and hence within British society is also a recurrent 
discourse in both sets of coverage; after the Birmingham pub bombings, for instance, The Guardian 
published an editorial with the headline ‘ Those who harbour terrorists’ which comments that the police 
bomb squad must be allowed to be ‘less fastidious in its enquiries among those suspected of guilty 
knowledge’, adding later that the ‘murderous tools’ of terrorism ‘are provided by sympathisers here’ (The 
Guardian, 23 November 1974, p.10). This response, across the political spectrum at the time, was the 
context in which a series of miscarriages of justice occurred.
The discourse of the ‘enemy within’ is exempliied by the recurrence of phrases such as ‘in our midst’, 
with its implication of ‘a traitor in our midst’ in articles and headlines throughout the two eras. It 
leads directly to the discourse of community responsibility, which occurs in both sets of coverage, 
but particularly in that of the Muslim-related events and demands that communities, rather than 
government or the security forces ‘tackle terrorism’: ‘Police, security services, politicians can’t beat 
terrorism…only communities can do that. And I have no doubt it will be the Muslim community which 
will eventually destroy these Islamic terrorists’ (‘Young, Clever and British’, The News of the World, 10 
July 2005). 
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Members of Irish and Muslim communities are frequently represented as being both inside and outside 
British civil society; one example of this discourse can be seen on pages 4-5 of The Sun on 13 July 2005, 
which carried the headline: 
  ‘7/7 Footie Fan who blew up commuters. Khaka …Tube bomber from a chippie. Suicide Lad  
  Age 22’. 
Here terms associated with terrorism are juxtaposed with terms expressive of Britishness, thus ‘tube 
bomber’ is juxtaposed with ‘chippie’ whilst above it ‘7/7’ is juxtaposed with ‘footie fan’, and below it 
‘suicide’ with ‘lad’. These juxtapositions transmit the notion of the ‘enemy within’, the idea that an 
attack on Britishness has occurred from its heart. Throughout the period under study we ind the press 
simultaneously representing Britishness as fragile and threatened by a ‘suspect’ Other, and claiming 
its importance and association with values such as the rule of law, the right to security, tolerance, 
secularism, freedom of religion, fairness, and non-violence. The press appears here to participate in the 
discourse of a ‘crisis of Britishness’ which has clearly gained momentum in recent years (Byrne, 2007; 
Ward, 2008). 
This is not a new phenomenon. On 10 December 1974, for instance, in a piece entitled ‘English girl on 
bomb charge’, The Guardian (p. 26) reports: ‘The number of accused around the country concerning 
bombing incidents is causing great dificulties for the prison authorities, and it is proving hard for 
them to ind suitable prisons for all of them’. This image of British prisons overlowing with Irish 
suspects clearly indicates the fear of Britain being swamped by the ‘Irish problem’. The article purports 
to cover the appearance in court of a total of 14 people in relation to various offences related to the 
pub bombings that occurred in Guildford on 5 October 1974, paying particular attention to the case 
of Annie Maguire. These offences included murder, illegal possession of explosives, and conspiracy to 
cause explosions. 13 of the 14 people (including the Maguire Seven and the Guildford Four) are lumped 
together into one group of Irish people implicitly portrayed as having acted in concert in planning and 
carrying out the Guildford pub bombing. 
At no stage does the Guardian article refer to the IRA. With the exception of the ‘English girl’ of the 
headline, who is later described as ‘English-born’, it refers only to Irish people (or people with Irish 
backgrounds) charged with terrorist-related offences, thereby implying that ‘the Irish’ are responsible for 
terrorism. The shock, embedded in the headline, that an ‘English girl’ could also be implicated, implies 
that Britain and Britishness might be contaminated by a threat that here is clearly identiied as ‘Irish’. 
The ambiguity of the phrase ‘English-born’ casts suspicion on Irish people born in Britain. The article does 
not clarify the girl’s identity and this increases the sense of a hidden enemy within Britain. The coverage 
of the July 2005 bombings echoes this, particularly in the level of shock expressed about the discovery 
that the perpetrators were British, exempliied in the headlines like those from The Sun discussed above. 
There were variations in the representations in the press. This was usually related to the targeted 
readerships and political orientations of the newspapers and to the perceived signiicance of the events 
and issues reported. In particular, we observed a divergence in coverage of some of these events between 
the centre-left press represented here by The Guardian, and the centre-right press, The Telegraph and The 
Daily Mail respectively. This is illustrated by our analysis of a sub-sample of 41 of the total of 277 articles 
on the so-called veil controversy, when former Home Secretary Jack Straw expressed his dificulties in 
talking to women wearing the niqab, or full-face veil. Whilst 13 articles presented the controversy in 
mainly neutral terms, it is signiicant that half (21) were sympathetic with Straw, often describing the 
wearing of the niqab as a threat to British values. Of the seven articles which were critical of Straw and 
sympathetic to Muslim women’s right to choose their own version of modest dress, six appeared in The 
Guardian. 
There is also a signiicant difference between the diaspora and the national press with the former 
unsurprisingly focusing more on events and issues directly relevant to their readerships, providing more 
positive images of Irish communities and Muslim communities, and focusing on the impact of being 
perceived as ‘suspect’ on members of the communities. This is consistent with recent research on how 
the perception among Muslims of negative representations has led to the rise of alternative media 
sources such as The Muslim News, and online interventions (see Gillespie, 2002; Ahmad, 2006; Noor, 
2007; Van Zoonen et al, 2011).
Our critical discourse analysis of press coverage of events relevant to Irish communities and Muslim 
communities in Britain that occurred between 1974 and 2007 has shown that these communities have 
been principally deined in relation to perceived British values, and that they become ‘suspect’ when 
they, or their assumed members, are judged by newsmakers not to abide by these values. However, we 
also found that the deining characteristic of much news coverage has been its ambiguity. Indeed, while 
constructions and representations of Irish and Muslim communities as consisting mainly of ‘decent, 
patriotic, law-abiding citizens’ are arguably positive, these constructions and representations become 
problematic when they are nearly always accompanied by the characterisation of these communities as 
harbouring dangerous extremists.
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5. Everyday Experiences of Being ‘Suspected’
We base most of this section on the discussion groups in Birmingham and London. Most of the 
discussion groups opened with a general question about the experience of living through periods of 
political violence and counter-terrorism measures. In most cases, Irish respondents then began to tell 
their stories. After a while the discussion switched to Muslim experiences. In each case there was a 
period of more general discussion and comparison following this. There was a great deal of interest in 
and curiosity about each other’s stories. Some of the younger Muslim participants (especially a few 
who had been in Britain for only 5-10 years) were not fully aware of recent British history and of the 
‘Troubles’ period. So they were particularly surprised to hear about the precedents to contemporary 
counter-terrorism measures and of the impact these had had on Irish communities and to notice 
parallels with the current experiences of Muslim communities. Despite differences of generation and 
experience, the strong empathy between Muslim and Irish participants was a striking feature of the 
discussion groups. Each group had its own speciic dynamic, but without exception attempts were made 
to understand the experience of others and to build bridges. A level of trust was established in some 
groups such that it allowed people to recount quite disturbing experiences. There was a consensus in all 
the groups that the comparison had been useful and beneicial. 
Both Irish and Muslim participants reported having suffered verbal and physical abuse in everyday 
encounters. There were similarities in the type of abuse experienced, which could include jokes about 
terrorism, being asked to speak for Islam or Ireland, being called names in the street or even being 
directly accused of terrorism. Irish respondents recounted the experience of being ignored or shunned 
at work or in shops or banks, while Muslim respondents recounted being stared at and shunned in the 
street or on public transport. 
In everyday communication the expression of negative attitudes towards these communities was similar, 
involving actual abuse or racist ‘jokes’ or remarks. For instance, a young Irish woman described being 
called ‘Semtex’ by an English colleague when working in a bar in London; a Muslim woman had a similar 
experience: ‘I remember they called us Bin Laden, the Bin Laden family, just because my friends were 
covered’ (Muslim woman, London). Negative responses in public space recounted by Muslim respondents 
were based solely on appearance, whereas the contexts in which Irish respondents were treated 
negatively involved speech and thus the revelation of ‘Irishness’ through accent:
  I arrived from Belfast here in 1983 and the minute I opened my mouth it was hell, you know. Well  
  yeah, Belfast accent, IRA, I mean that’s what they think. They plant bombs. And so even coming to  
  this meeting I am nervous (Irish woman, London)
Clearly, the category ‘suspect’ is linked to, and determined by, different, historically rooted modes of 
racialisation, which use ‘all kinds of signiiers and markers’ (Anthias, Yuval-Davies and Cain 1993, p.15). It 
adds a further dimension to these racializations, and intensiies the sense of being regarded and treated 
differently.   
These everyday experiences of being treated as suspect occur in a context of media representations 
where both Irish communities and Muslim communities and individuals are, or have been portrayed 
as in various ways ‘outsiders’ inside British society. All of the groups engaged in discussion of media, 
sometimes at some length. Several groups felt that the media were in some way responsible for their 
communities being treated as ‘suspect’; they particularly problematised the tabloid press, focusing on 
the negative impact of headlines: 
  And as an Irishman working and trying to earn a living for my family, it was very dificult. I used  
  to ind it dificult to buy a paper because on the headlines, the headlines would be enough to 
  stop me buying that paper. And I would ind it dificult to get on with daily life  
  (Irish Man, Birmingham). 
  But I think the thing that gets me the most is just media words. You know, things like   
  fundamentalists, Islamists, Moslems instead of Muslims, things like that. That’s the thing that gets 
  me. There is no, there is no good word for us. There is no way to describe us  
  (Muslim man, London).
Some respondents felt that The Guardian and The Independent gave more balanced coverage, and there 
was some praise of the BBC and Channel Four, though the representation of Muslims in the Despatches 
series was strongly criticised. One discussion group was made up entirely of younger participants. This 
group developed quite a detailed discussion of images of Muslim and Irish people in popular culture, 
commenting on the transformations in these representations since the period of the Troubles, and 
since 9/11. While, in their view, Irishness has become ‘cool’: ‘the Irish people, you know, they are all fun 
guys who like to get drunk or whatever’ (Muslim man, London), being Muslim is always represented as 
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a problem: ‘there are no normal Muslims on telly’ (Muslim man, London). Whilst our respondents were 
critical of media representations, their comments were nuanced and sophisticated, analysing divergences 
between headlines and the content of articles, and differentiating between media outlets, as well as 
commenting on audience responses. 
The experience of being treated differently resulted not only from encounters in everyday life and 
negative media representations, but also directly from the implementation of counter-terrorism 
measures. There were some positive comments on the role of the police, but negative accounts were 
more numerous. A third of the incidents recounted involved police actions or activity. Both groups felt 
that Irish or Muslim areas or buildings (mosques, Catholic churches, Irish pubs) were under surveillance. 
Six instances of ‘stop and search’ were described, and ive of these accounts were by Muslims (two 
women and three men). One case involved young children (aged 10) being stopped and searched by 
police. There were ive accounts of actual arrests (of family members, friends or acquaintances), and all 
of these were by Irish respondents; in one case the account was of severe violence at the hands of police 
in the 1970s. These responses in the groups are characterised by a difference between the experience of 
actual arrests on the Irish side, and of stop and search on the Muslim side. 
The experience of discrimination while travelling internationally is common to both Muslim and Irish 
respondents. Participants recounted incidents where they were subjected to extra or intrusive checks, 
particularly at ports and airports. Muslim respondents reported being taken off lights; being asked to 
remove clothing; and being interrogated and accused of having undertaken al-Qaeda training. Travel 
destinations such as Pakistan and Yemen seemed themselves to be treated as suspect by airport oficials 
as travel between Britain and Ireland had been during the earlier era. 
From all of this we can conclude that the experience of being treated as a member of a ‘suspect’ 
community was shared by Irish and Muslim respondents and that it resulted from: negative responses in 
everyday encounters; from police activity; and security operations at ports and airports. 
Impacts of being ‘suspected’
The accounts of the effects of such experiences on individuals and communities also showed strong 
similarities between the two eras. A state of fearfulness was described by Muslims in the present 
period and Irish in relation to the past, and in both cases, ‘lying low’ and ‘keeping your head down’ were 
common responses. In the Muslim case this involved not discussing politics (for example at work), 
avoiding certain areas of the city, being careful on the telephone and Internet, and taking care not to 
mention al-Qaeda or terrorism, even in jokes. Irish respondents frequently described keeping quiet 
so that their accents would not be noticed, or being asked to speak on behalf of their irst generation 
parents in shops. In both cases the state of fearfulness and suspicion was said to lead to divisions 
within the community, and to community members suspecting each other. Fear and caution were also 
generated by knowledge of the Terrorism Laws and by what seemed to be the arbitrariness of their 
implementation.
However, anger and alienation were also felt, and both Irish and Muslim respondents made connections 
between being treated as ‘suspect’ and political mobilisation of various kinds. In the Irish case, the policy 
of internment in Northern Ireland was described as a ‘recruitment tool’ for the IRA. A young Muslim man 
of Eritrean background described how he and his friends had been regularly stopped and searched, and 
stared at in public spaces.  He felt that these pressures could lead to various forms of politicisation:
  Because I don’t know whether you are aware of this but young Muslims right now, are thriving 
  on this image, this image of yeah, they are jumping on it, they are like yeah, this is the new cool.  
  Do you know what I am trying to say. We’ll go round in crowds. We will put our little things  
  across our face and we’re saying yeah, we’re doing this, we’re doing that and I’m going to Gaza  
  and I’m going to [slaps his hands]. They are thriving on it. And I don’t know whether this is new to 
  people but young Muslims are going absolutely crazy. Because they’ve been labelled so much  
  Muslims as being these terrorists and being this in these recent times that there is a group, a  
  minority of people I should say who have actually decided that you know what I am going to be  
  what you are labelling me to be (Muslim man, London; authors’ italics).
This comment illustrates how the focus on the ‘extremist minority’ in public discourse can have 
unpredictable effects; this young Muslim man suggests that identiication with ‘extremism’ can become 
desirable and ‘cool’ the more it is viliied by the media and establishment. He is however at pains to 
distance himself from such responses: ‘And I’m saying to progress you have to be positive and go with 
your life as normal’. 
More everyday forms of resistance and resilience became a recurring theme across the groups. A young, 
second generation Pakistani British woman, for instance, expressed her indignation at being treated as 
a foreigner because of wearing the hijab (head covering or headscarf; see Rizvi 2007 for analysis of the 
particular targeting of Muslim women): 
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  It’s funny that, it’s funny, you know, just a piece of cloth on your head people start to think a bit  
  different. And yet people when I speak with them, ‘Wow, you’ve got quite good English’. Well, I 
  was born and raised here. My dad is here since he was nine so I kind of ... And they are like   
  oh, okay. You know, it’s funny when someone … I am doing my degree and my class is full of, a lot 
  of international students, a lot of Europeans, Eastern Europeans, Europeans. […] A few of these  
  Europeans were talking to me they were like ‘wow’ … Sorry? ‘You have really good English.’ This 
  is coming from a foreigner that I have got good English. [laughter] I was like thank you  
  (Muslim woman, London).5
In this way she interrogates the exclusions she has experienced as a visibly Muslim woman in British 
society (which included being ignored when asking the way in the street) and asserts her British identity. 
Irish respondents also described their resistance to being associated with terrorism:  
  Obviously I am a Londoner as well as being half Irish, so whenever a bomb went off someone  
  would come into the ofice and it would be ‘efing Irish’ this and ‘efing Irish’ that. And I would  
  say, ‘Excuse me, I am half Irish and I don’t appreciate that.’ And then there would be the, ‘Well,  
  you know we didn’t …’. Yeah. Right. (Irish woman, London)
Responses to being treated as ‘suspect’ shared by Irish and Muslim participants were fear, cautiousness, 
lying low, staying in ‘safe’ areas and keeping quiet. Resilience and various forms of resistance were 
also described. Both Irish and Muslim respondets made direct links between counter-terrorism policies 
and politicisation, which may or may not lead to violence. However, in the Irish stories there were no 
accounts of an equivalent to the contemporary cultural afirmation of Muslim identities in response to 
attacks in London and New York and counter-terrorism. On the contrary, the impression of a community 
being silenced and afraid was stronger and more widespread in the Irish accounts. Our discussion of this 
phenomenon and comparison of experiences in the two eras is developed in the next section where we 
draw on the key informants’ responses. 
6. Similarities and Differences in Experiences
Key informants were speciically asked to compare the contemporary period with the period when the 
Irish were ‘suspect’. The similarity mentioned more than any other was that both Irish communities and 
Muslim communities were associated with terrorism and similar measures had been implemented in 
both eras. One second-generation Irish man working in a community organisation in Birmingham stated:
  Well, it’s a bit I suppose the same as the Muslims are suffering now. Erm, all of the Irish people  
  then were treated as terrorists and bombers and that… 
Muslims, yeah. In general conversation, they say, ‘oh, these Muslims, you know, they are all at it, they are 
all making bombs and that’. Same as the Irish. I mean, the Guildford Four. Look at how long they suffered. 
A number of Irish key informants responded along similar lines. A young Muslim woman working in a 
community organisation in London commented on the similarities in another way:
  I would have been very young sadly to remember too much about the Irish experience. But I  
  do remember the bombing of the Conservative Party conference. I remember the notion of it  
  being a threat as great as you now hear in terms of the terrorist threat you now hear from  
  Muslim extremists identiied… I think there were resonances of what Muslims are now   
  experiencing in terms of questions to whether or not they endorsed parliamentary democracy,  
  whether or not they showed allegiance to the Queen
In this response the similarity is drawn in terms of the marginalisation of Irish and Muslims as perceived 
endorsers of political violence and as potential traitors. Implicitly both were positioned outside of or 
in ambivalent relation to Britishness, and the values British citizens are expected to share. Both these 
key informants are making connections between the two eras and commenting on the process by 
which whole communities are rendered as ‘risk repositories by virtue of sharing some or other of the 
characteristics of the “typical” terrorist’ (Mythen and Walklate 2006:390). 
The main differences discussed by signiicant numbers of the key informants related to their 
assessments of the relative vulnerability of Irish communities and Muslim communities as immigrants to 
discrimination and harassment and of their comparative public proiles.  Many interviewees thought that 
Muslims were more straightforwardly identiiable and therefore could not hide and were more easily 
harassed. A leading civil liberties activist in London argued:
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  I am not saying there wasn’t a racist element in the 1970s but you know, but you are more  
  markedly different. I mean, what I am saying is in the 1970s you could probably lower your voice  
  or not speak, which is not great for any human being but you can probably do that and be smart  
  and get out of trouble and you can’t, you know, lower your skin tone, that is an added dimension,  
  I think, you know, that sometimes people forget.
A young Muslim professional in Birmingham viewed things to some extent differently:
  … in terms of differences yes, I think the Irish people probably had it hard because we haven’t  
  seen that but when you look at our side maybe they had it more harder than us because they  
  were very much involved with the English community, with the British people, whereas the  
  Muslim community are kind of a Muslim community itself. The only time they probably face our  
  non-Muslim colleagues is probably at work or if we go out of the area where we live. So we  
  probably get it easier to a certain extent… So I think the Irish probably had it harder some points  
  but then if you look at the other points maybe not as hard because we don’t just get attacked  
  because of the religion that we follow, it’s also because of the colour and the racism issue comes  
  into it.
His perception of the positioning of Irish people in relation to the English/British results in empathetic 
comments on how things may have been harder for them in the past; he is implying that their degree 
of contact with the majority ethnic population and possibly their expectations may have led to a worse 
backlash. However, his description of Muslims being afforded protection from backlash through their 
place-based communities also implied the defensiveness against backlash that this can constitute 
as careful decisions have to be made about ‘if we go outside of the area where we live’. He ends by 
echoing the point of the previous quotation that visible difference makes Muslims more susceptible to 
harassment than the Irish. 
His analysis of the complexity was borne out in these comments by an Irish woman in Birmingham with 
long experience in local Irish organisations:
  See the sad part about the Irish as well is that in some cases erm, the older people now as well  
  if they could … Because of the, how they felt and how they were discriminated against or how  
  they felt not as valued as sort of like a, one of the host country, they felt like they were foreigners  
  and that, if they could get away with being classed as English, they thought that was a great kind  
  of achievement really.
Here she is expressing a view about the responses of many Irish people in the 1970s, and ‘now as well’, 
and their perception of not being valued (see also Hickman and Walter 1997). Her comments are similar 
to accounts of the ‘conidence inside the Muslim community’ being ‘at an all time low’ and that many 
feel like ‘conditional Britons’ (Bari 2011).
A inal extract further illustrates the complexity of accounting for differences between the two eras and 
is taken from an interview with a worker in an Irish voluntary organisation in Birmingham:
  I don’t know if there are similarities. Erm, I don’t know if there would be the extreme fervour,  
  the hatred of the Seventies because a major incident didn’t happen in the city. That prompted  
  perhaps the most mild mannered and congenial people to turn against the Irish. You know, little  
  old ladies that wouldn’t say boo to a goose would certainly throw in their comments against 
  their Irish neighbours. So you know, I am sure it does go on. And as I said before there was the  
  protection. There’s more protection around legislation now then there was in the Seventies.
A number of key informants, both Irish and Muslim, held the view that the Irish had had no protection 
in the past; and that by comparison, due to a number of legislative changes, Muslims had more rights 
in the 2000s. This latter positioning, it was stressed, neither prevented or eliminated the risk of being 
constructed as ‘suspect’. 
The contrast was also drawn between the more assertive public proile of some Muslims now compared 
with the lower public proile of the Irish in the previous era. Although the better legislative protection 
afforded for human rights and against discrimination was seen as underpinning this difference, the 
explanation was also seen to lie with the response of many of the younger generations of Muslims 
to being ‘suspect’. One common response has been a reassertion of Muslim identiications amongst 
younger people, with many being proud to express this publicly. Their more conident public response 
compared with the similar Irish generations was partly attributed to the second generation Muslims 
being older now than the equivalent Irish second generation were in the 1970s. In contrast a majority 
of other Muslims, usually of the migrant generation, are characterised as keeping their ‘heads down’ in a 
similar manner to the response of many Irish in the 1970s. 
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7. Relationship to multi-ethnic Britain and Britishness
Many participants described their identities in terms of having a mixed or hybrid background, and 
many Muslim participants asserted British identity in the face of responses which racialised them or 
constructed them as outside Britishness:
  People, like really good friends of mine that don’t have any fear of me because they are my friend  
  they want to ask questions. I am thinking how long have you known me, what are you talking  
  about. And they’ll sort of say, ‘So you, do you have a Somali passport?’ And I am thinking what  
  kind of a question is that? I said, ‘But you’ve known me since primary school so is it likely that I  
  wouldn’t have a British passport?’ (Muslim woman, London)
For Irish respondents, particularly those born in Britain, the issue was less about claiming Britishness, but 
more about the dificulty of working out how to be Irish, in the face of both the stigmatisation of an 
identity tainted with ‘suspectness’ and the assumption that being white they must be English:
  I mean, both my parents are Irish and I was kind of like, when I was young I didn’t know if I was  
  Irish or I was English and at school you were English but you were Irish really  
  (Irish woman, London). 
  I think the other thing is about talking about identity and stuff and keeping quiet. I mean for  
  years a lot of second generation would not say they were Irish, probably until the Pogues came  
  about in the Eighties (Irish woman, Birmingham)
In London, there was a very strong identiication with the city:
  I mean, a lot of the reason why my life is the way that it is and I don’t really ind any stumbling  
  blocks socially or sort of academically, I am born in London, I am raised in London, sort of thing,  
  I am a Londoner. You know what I am trying to say. This is what I know as home. I am Eritrean  
  originally but you know I’ve been here longer sort of thing. [everybody nods]  
  (Muslim man, London)
  IF12: There’s me, born here, not quite sure what, you know, am I Irish or I am a bit English or  
  maybe half English.
  IF2: No, you are a Londoner.
In Birmingham too, the city was an important focus for identiication, and was perceived as ‘safer’ than 
the rest of Britain:
  I think as a community generally we feel more protected, partly because in Birmingham it’s a  
  large community and frankly, you know, if there is any abuse people will hear about it and it’s, as  
  you said [laughs] white people are a minority so they’d better be a bit careful  
  (Muslim man, Birmingham)
There was a general sense among Muslim respondents in London and Birmingham of the rest of Britain 
being dangerous territory. It is signiicant that for Irish respondents the sense of threat was generalised, 
for instance, Irish participants in Birmingham spoke of feeling strongly targeted all over the Midlands 
after the Birmingham pub bombings. In contrast, most Muslim participants felt relatively safe in London, 
even though a bomb attack had taken place there. The possibility of the multicultural city representing 
a safe space for a targeted community seems therefore to be a recent phenomenon, and is perhaps a 
positive comment on how everyday multiculture can work in Britains’ increasingly diverse urban spaces.
Several respondents were at pains to emphasise their connections with, and openness to other cultures, 
and a multicultural, urban identity was constructed in almost all the groups. This was sometimes 
opposed to a perception of white English people as monocultural, unfriendly and quite often threatening 
and hostile : 
  I spoke to Irish people before and I found that probably, amongst English people very ignorant but 
  Irish people tend to be very understanding because of the fact that they’ve come from a similar  
  situation to what we’ve been through’ (Muslim Man, Birmingham).
In some cases, friendliness warmth and family orientation were seen as common ground between 
Muslims and Irish people; in the quotation that follows ‘the English’ are not referred to directly, but are 
implied by the phrase ‘Irish people were more welcoming and accepting’:
2IF, MF: Irish woman, Muslim woman; IM, MM : Irish Man, Muslim Man. We do not give details of ethnicity here as we did not systematically 
solicit this information, given the small sample size, and emphasis on respondents volunteering information rather than being questioned in 
these groups.  
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  MF: It’s interesting because my family have lived in X since the early Eighties so pretty much all  
  our neighbours were Irish. Everybody we knew was Irish except for the three other Somali families 
  that were here in the Eighties that we knew. And deinitely we found just as African immigrants  
  that Irish people were more welcoming and more accepting …
  IF1: But don’t you think the cultures are something similar?
  MF: The culture deinitely.
  IF: Because when I went out to Egypt to my husband’s family it was like going to Ireland only  
  instead of having sand, instead of having grass there was sand. But it was the same culture.
  IF2: Hospitality
  IF1: You know the key in the door, the door open. And everybody knew each other and would be  
  in and out of each other’s houses. They would be sitting with their rollers watching the telly.  
  And it was exactly the same, except the telly was all in Arabic and everybody spoke Arabic. I’ve  
  actually learned a bit about it. (Discussion between Irish and Muslim women, London). 
At times religion itself was the linking factor, with the white English / British Other deined as secular, as 
this extract from one of the Birmingham groups attests:
  IF: Even, even, might seem to be a bit strange but most Irish communities and obviously Islamic  
  communities have a faith to start with which most secular British people don’t. And I think we’ve  
  got a starting point. 
  MM: We’ve got a common ground.
Clearly, these indings have important implications for debates about multiculturalism, and deinitions 
of what it means to be British. Our respondents claim a multicultural, urban British identity which 
interrogates accounts of Britishness that are fundamentally based on white Englishness. The discussion 
groups also, and importantly, attest to the damage wrought to communities, individuals and social 
cohesion more broadly when certain groups are constructed, and treated as ‘suspect’.  
8. Conclusions
We set out to investigate across two eras of political violence whether communities had been 
represented as ‘suspect’ and if so to explore what the impact of this was for the everyday lives of Irish 
communities and Muslim communities. Our aim was also to consider the implications of constructing 
communities as ‘suspect’ for counter-terrorism measures and for social cohesion policies. We conclude 
that the representations and treatment of the Irish in the past have set a precedent for the treatment 
of Muslims in the current period. We have traced the way in which the reactions and responses to 
political violence in 1974 clearly had embedded within them the principles, and gave rise to, the 
prevention measures that have been practised on an even more systematic scale throughout the 2000s. 
Despite anti-discrimination legislation, Muslim communities today are subjected to a similar process of 
construction as ‘suspect’ as Irish communities in the previous era. 
The frequent juxtaposition in the press, in political debate and in policy documents of ‘the innocent Irish’ 
and ‘moderate Muslims’ with ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ effectively leads Irish and Muslim communities 
to be constructed as a two-faced Janus, with the ‘law-abiding’ always deined in relation to ‘extremists’. 
Irish and Muslim communities are simultaneously and ambiguously depicted in public discourse as 
victims, allies and suspects, and the boundaries between the three are seen as shifting and permeable. 
This permeability and ambiguity has arguably contributed to fostering a social and political climate that 
has permitted, and seemingly continues to permit, grave violations of civil liberties and human rights 
with tragic consequences to take place, such as those we have witnessed in the Irish context in the past 
and continue to witness in the Muslim context in the current period.
From the evidence of the discussion groups and the key informants we concluded that the experience 
of being treated as a member of a ‘suspect’ community was shared by Irish and Muslim participants and 
that it resulted from: negative responses in everyday encounters, from neighbours, at work, in shops, on 
the street; police activity; and from security operations at ports and airports. Responses to being treated 
as ‘suspect’ shared by Irish and Muslim participants were fear, cautiousness, lying low, staying in ‘safe’ 
areas and keeping quiet. Resilient responses and practices of resistance were described for both eras. 
Irish and Muslim participants made direct links between counter-terrorism policies and various forms of 
politicisation. However, in the Irish stories there were no accounts of an equivalent to the contemporary 
cultural afirmation of Muslim identities in response to counter-terrorism policies. On the contrary, the 
impression of a community being silenced and afraid was stronger and more widespread in the Irish 
accounts.
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In summary, this research has generated evidence across two eras of political violence that both 
representations of communities as ‘suspect’ and the implementation of counter-terrorism policies 
operate with notions of ‘suspect communities’. Imposing boundaries around particular communities in 
this way – supposedly identiied by appearance or accent or types of behaviour - limits and damages 
experiences of belonging. It induces a range of feelings and responses – anger, alienation, resignation, 
fear, resistance – all of which are potentially exclusionary in impact and undermine feelings of 
acceptance. The impacts of these representations and measures can include a process whereby forms of 
belonging that previously were part of a wider set of identiications for an individual (for example, being 
a Muslim) can become more important as a result of being ‘suspected’ of a likelihood of sympathising 
with (particular ideas or groups) or committing violent acts. In this situation when no other attributes 
of a person are recognised or valued the negative consequences for the individual and for society as a 
whole are serious and concerning.
Community cohesion policies throughout the 2000s emphasised the need to ‘have a common vision 
and a sense of belonging for all communities’ (Guidance on Community Cohesion 2008), the need to 
emphasise ‘what binds communities together rather than what divides them’ (Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion 2007) and the ‘need to bring down the barriers that divide people in our country today’ 
(Cameron, 2011). The ambiguity surrounding identifying who is an ‘extremist’ or a ‘terrorist’ has resulted 
in hostile encounters in everyday life between those who think they are under threat towards those 
who are associated with that threat. This has the effect of reinforcing boundaries between groups and is 
vividly expressed in our research by participants who lament that there seems to be only one vocabulary 
with which to discuss Muslims and their contribution to British society. 
This research shows therefore that it is not suficient to distinguish between the ‘moderates’ and the 
‘extremists’ to guard against this impact. The constant recirculation of representations and practices of 
‘suspect communities’ as groups of people made up of the ‘innocent’ and the ‘threatening’, and identiied 
by generalised characteristics of ethnicity, religion, colour, accent or, now, supposed ideology, is inimical 
to social cohesion due to its potentially polarising effects on the population as a whole and its unjust 
consequences for Irish communities in the past and Muslim communities today. 
Few lessons appear to have been learnt from the period of ‘The Troubles’, as key informants frequently 
remarked. Eventually the so-called ‘irrational, mad, fanatics’ of Irish republicanism were re-engaged 
in negotiations and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was the result. Those who were previously 
viliied are now part of the government in Northern Ireland with electoral support. The lifting of fear 
for Irish people in this country after 1998 was palpable, as relected in our discussion groups. The 
recent assertions of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary that what is referred to as ‘non-violent 
extremism’ is an incubator of ‘violent extremism’, despite contrary evidence, is only likely to further 
reinforce the negative impacts on Muslims in Britain of counter-terrorism policies. It is also likely to 
further encourage the public at large, on this evidence, both to be more fearful (as it is rarely linked to 
any transparent assessment of risk) and therefore to treat Muslims as potential ‘suspects’ or legitimate 
objects of abuse.   
The main counteracting force that we identiied to a categorisation of Muslims as potential ‘suspects’, as 
a result of oficial policies and government and media representations, lay in the cosmopolitanism that 
characterises places like London and Birmingham. The sympathetic exchanges in the discussion groups 
demonstrated this repeatedly. If discourses of ‘suspectness’ were not so widespread perhaps deeper 
connections would also develop with the majority ethnic group. These documented representations of 
communities as ‘suspect’ illustrate that hostile ideas about Irish in the past and Muslims in the present 
are not only generated by organisations like the English Defence League or Combat 18, in fact the former 
openly acknowledge that they feed off tabloid headlines. 
The empathetic connections established between participants in the discussion groups indicate the 
limitations of the community cohesion agenda with its identiication of ‘communities’ as the site of 
the problem of preventing political violence and as the site of strategies of social cohesion. There have 
been calls to engage community involvement more positively in a ight against extremism (Spalek and 
Lambert 2008, Jackson 2008, Bari 2011). Our research suggests that any positive representations of and 
engagement with Muslims in the current context would be beneicial. But our conclusion is different. 
This is because our focus has not been on extremism. We have been concerned to chart the impact of 
being ‘suspected’ on the everyday lives of the so-called ‘innocent’ or ‘moderate’ majority. It is necessary 
to change the negative impacts of the process of constructing communities as ‘suspect’. This requires a 
change in the practice of conceiving of certain communities within civil society as problematic for social 
cohesion and of conlating this with conceptualising certain populations as ‘suspect’ where political 
violence is concerned. 
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The current government has stated that it seeks to separate the community cohesion agenda from the 
counter-terrorism agenda. This is useful but their location of the problem of political violence and the 
focus of counter-terrorism remains ixed on Muslim communities and a strategy of rooting out extreme 
ideas. This is a classic counter-insurgency strategy of the type that was unsuccessful in Northern Ireland. 
We have outlined that there are many more continuities between the two eras of political violence, 
particularly in counter-terrorism policies, than politicians and policy makers readily admit. A more 
successful policy would involve learning from this past.
9. Policy Relevance
This is the irst large comparative and historical project engaging simultaneously with two large ethnic 
and religious minorities in Britain who have been at the centre of security policy concerns for several 
decades. Our multi-level and multi-disciplinary approach is a contribution to ongoing relections on the 
consequences and effectiveness of past and existing measures to counter-terrorism.
In this section we highlight the lessons learnt and the recommendations identiied from the assessment 
of counter-terrorism policies, related discourses, and the experiences of Irish communities and Muslim 
communities.
• Political violence remains a central security concern for the state and its response continues to be  
 couched within the notion of ‘emergency’ and ‘exceptionalism’, despite the apparent normalisation of  
 terrorism with the Terrorism Act 2000, when counter-terrorism laws were made permanent.
• This is because the strategic ideas underpinning counter-terrorism over four decades have not   
 changed.
• There has been a widening of interpretations of the notion of terrorism, which render the demarcation  
 between what is lawful and criminal activities extremely thin and ambiguous. 
• While it would seem that it was generally not the deliberate intention of policy-makers to actually  
 demonise communities, counter-terrorism policies have always had the effect of frightening and  
 alienating communities, regardless of the arguments through which they were presented and justiied.  
 So, while we acknowledge that those who make and enforce such measures might not believe in the  
 idea of ‘suspect communities’, those at the receiving end are likely to perceive that they are considered 
 as such.
• The recent linking of extremist ideas that are non-violent with violent extremism, on the one hand  
 reinforces the notion of a ‘suspect’ community and on the other hand makes explicit what has always  
 been implicit in the idea of ‘the enemy within’ and the injunction that dangerous people are lurking ‘in  
 our midst’.
• The impact of counter-terrorism practices and representations of ‘suspectness’ upon everyday   
 relations and experiences have been very similar for Irish communities and for Muslim communities  
 across four decades. 
• The persistence of the negative effects of the reproduction of ideas of ‘suspectness’, shows that the  
 legal protections afforded by anti-discrimination legislation and the Human Rights Act, despite some  
 undoubted effectiveness, have not been suficient to safeguard the well-being of the members of the  
 communities exposed to counter-terrorism measures.
• Nevertheless, the long-term effects of anti-discrimination policies combined with a determination on  
 the part of many Muslims to afirm their Britishness and assert their voice within the democratic  
 process in a more conident way than was available to Irish communities in the 1970s. 
• In the previous era of political violence recasting the ‘threat’ and engaging in direct negotiations, rather  
 than the immediate effects of laws and policy slogans such as ‘cohesion’ or ‘de-radicalisation’, are  
 what allowed communities to gradually exit the category of ‘suspect’ and to become rehabilitated into  
 society.
• Bringing Irish people together with Muslim people was particularly useful not only because they  
 could share similar experiences but also because the Irish participants spoke about (and in fact where  
 the actual embodiment of) the possibility of coming out from the category of suspicion, of becoming  
 ‘normal’ again. This was an important sign of hope, a reassuring factor for the Muslim participants.
• The reciprocal identiication of experiences and the empathetic relationship established between Irish  
 and Muslim participants in our discussion groups is on example of the lived possibility of coexistence  
 and mutual trust based on shared social and political concerns in a diverse society. Valuing the legacy  
 of multiculturalism and its everyday practice would help bring down barriers and emphasise what is  
 held in common  more effectively than constructing ‘suspect communities’.
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Recommendations:
• There should be more historical awareness of the relative effectiveness of past (and not just the  
 immediate, recent past) counter-terrorism measures, and of their consequences, when developing new  
 frameworks to counter-terrorism.
• Greater awareness of, and sensitivity to possible impacts on individuals and communities should  
 underpin the formulation of counter-terrorism policies.
• Greater awareness in and by the press and political establishment of the dangers of characterising  
 communities as ‘harbouring extremists’, as responsible for solving the problem of terrorism, or as split  
 between the innocent, law-abiding, moderate majority and the extremist, criminal minority, would  
 help to diminish the negative focus on Muslim communities..
• The conscious avoidance of extreme language and terminology such as ‘evil’, ‘perverse’, ‘barbaric’ and  
 so on, and particularly the association of these terms with Islam and Muslim/s (or any other group),  
 in the media, in political commentary and in policy documents would help to diminish the negative  
 impacts of such representations on Muslim communities. 
• Policies that foster the practices of multiculturalism based on less bounded notions of communities  
 may be more successful in promoting social cohesion within an increasingly ethnically, religiously and  
 culturally diverse society, than the focus on suspect communities as a source of and responsible for a  
 solution to political violence. 
 
27
References
Ahmad, F. (2006) ‘British Muslim Perceptions and Opinions on News Coverage of September 11’,  
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(6): 961-982.
Ansari, H. (2004) The Inidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800. London: Hurst.
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
Anthias F. and Yuval-Davies, N. (1983) ‘Contextualizing Feminism: Gender, Ethnic & Class divisions’, 
Feminist Review, 15: 62-75.
Banaji, S. and Al-Ghabban, A. (2006) ‘“Neutrality Comes From Inside Us”: British-Asian and Indian 
Perspectives on Television News after 11 September’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32 (6): 
1005 -1026.
Bari, M. A. (2011) ‘No section of British society should be treated with suspicion’, OpenDemocracy 
(http://www.opendemocracy.net, downloaded on 26 June 2011)
Bartlett, J, J.Birdwell, and M.King (2010) The Edge of Violence, London: Demos.
Byrne, B. (2007) ‘Crisis of Identity: Englishness, Britishness and Whiteness’, in G. MacPhee and P. Poddar 
(eds) Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective. Oxford and New York: Berghahn. 
Blair, T. (2004) ‘Full text: Tony Blair’s speech’ on military action in Iraq, Sedgeield, 4 March, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/05/iraq.iraq 
Blair, T. (2005a) ‘Blair on bomb blasts’. Statement from Downing Street, 07/07.
Blair, T. (2005b) ‘Blair speech on terror’, delivered at Labour Party national conference, 16/07.
Blair, T. (2005c) ‘Full text of Tony Blair’s speech’, Brighton, 27/09.
Blair, T. (2006) ‘Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration’, 08/12.
Blunkett, D. (2003) ‘One nation, many faiths – unity and diversity in multi-faith Britain’, Speech at 
University of York, 30/10.
Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2007) ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on 
Police Stop and Search’, Modern Law Review, 70: 936-961.
Burr, V. (2003) Social Constructionism. London: Routledge.
Cameron, D. (2011) ‘PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference’, 5 February, http://www.number10.
gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293 
(accessed 10 March 2011).
Carlile, Lord (2005) Proposals by Her Majesty’s Government for Changes to the Laws against Terrorism. 
Report by the Indepen-dent Reviewer Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., London, 6 October.
Carlile, Lord (2011) Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and 
Strategy, London: HM Government, www.homeofice.org.uk (accessed 07/06/11).
Clarke, C. (2005) ‘Statement to parliament by the Home Secretary on new terrorist laws’, 20/07.
Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) Our Shared Future. London: Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion.
DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2007) Preventing violent extremism – 
Winning hearts and minds. London: DCLG. 
DCLG (2008) Guidance for local authorities on community cohesion contingency planning and tension 
monitoring. London, May.
Dor, D. (2003) ‘On Newspaper Headlines as Relevance Optimizers’, Journal of Pragmatics, 35: 695-721.
English, R. (2006) ‘Foreword’, in G. McGladdery, The Provisional IRA in England: the bombing campaign 
1973–1997, Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
Fairclough, N. (1989) Language and Power, London and New York: Longman.
Gamble, A. and Wright, T. eds. (2009) Britishness: Perspectives on the British Question, Oxford and Malden: 
Wiley Blackwell.
Gillespie, M., (2002) ‘Dynamics of Diasporas: South Asian Media and Transnational Cultural Politics’ in 
Stald, G. and T. Tufte., eds. Global Encounters: Media and Cultural Transformations. University of Luton 
Press: 151-173.
28
Gillespie, Marie (2006) ‘Transnational Television Audiences after September 11’, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 32(6): 903–921.
Halliday. F. (2002) Two hours that shook the world. London: Saqi
Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords and House of Commons, 1974-2007.
Harb, Z. and Bessaiso, E. (2006) ‘British Arab Muslim Audiences and TV after September 11’, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(6): 1063-1076.
Hickman, M.J. (1998) ‘Reconstructing deconstructing “race”: British political discourses about the Irish in 
Britain’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(2): 288-307.
Hickman, M. J. and B. Walter (1997) Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain, London: 
Commission for Racial Equality.
Hillyard, P. (1993) Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. 
London: Pluto Press in association with Liberty.
Hillyard, P. (2005) ‘The “War on Terror”: lessons from Ireland’, European Civil Liberties Network, ecln.org
HM Government (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy. London: The 
Stationery Ofice, July.
HM Government (2009) Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism. London: The Stationery Ofice, March.
HM Government (2011) Prevent Strategy. London: The Stationery Ofice, June. 
Holland, J. (1981) ‘Social Class and Changes in the Orientation to Meanings’, Sociology, 15(1): 1-18.
Holland, J. (1986) ‘Gender and Class: Adolescent Conceptions of the Division of Labour’. CORE, 10 (2). 
Home Ofice (1999) Business as Usual. Maximising business resilience to terrorist bombings. A handbook 
for managers. London: Home Ofice.
Home Ofice (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team Chaired by Ted 
Cantle (‘Cantle Report’), London: H.M. Government, December. 
House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee (2005) Terrorism and Community Relations, Sixth Report of 
Session 2004-2005, Volumes 1&2, London: The Stationery Ofice, April.
House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee (2010) Preventing Violent 
Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, London: The Stationery Ofice, March.
Huntington, S. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Summer.
Jackson, R. (2008) Counter-terrorism and communities: an interview with Robert Lambert’, Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 1 (2): 293-308.
Jaworski, A. and Coupland, N. (2006) ‘Introduction: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis’, in A. Jaworski and 
N. Coupland (eds) The Discourse Reader. London: Routledge: 1-37.
Kilcullen, D. (2004) ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/
documents/kilcullen.pdf (accessed 19 December 2010).
Kundnani, A. (2009) Spooked. How not to prevent violent extremism. London: IRR.
Livingstone, K. (2005) ‘Mayor’s Statement’, 07/07, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/mayor_
statement_070705.jsp
Lloyd (Lord of Berwick) (1996) Inquiry into legislation against terrorism, October.
McGovern, M (2010) Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? Comparing Irish and british Muslim 
Experiences of Counter-insurgency Law and Policy, Report of a Symposium held in Cultúrlann McAdam Ó 
Fiaich, Falls Road, Belfast, 23-24 June 2009.
Meer, N., Dwyer, C., & Modood, T. (2010) ‘Embodying Nationhood? Conceptions of British national 
identity, citizenship & gender in the “Veil Affair”’, The Sociological Review, 58 (1): 84-111.
Miller, D. (1994) Don’t mention the war: Northern Ireland, propaganda and the media. London: Pluto Press.
Moore, K., Mason, P. and Lewis, J. (2008) Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims 
in the National Print News Media 2000-2008. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies; 
at www.cardiff.ac.uk/jomec/resources/08channel4-dispatches.pdf (accessed 19 March 2010).
Mythen, G. and Walklate, S. (2006) ‘Criminology and Terrorism. Which Thesis? Risk Society or 
Governmentality?’, British Journal of Criminology, 46 (3): 379-398.
29
Noor, H. (2007) ‘Assertions of identities through news production: News-making among teenage Muslim 
girls in London and New York’, European Journal of Cultural Studies, 10 (3): 374-388
Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) ‘From the “Old” to the “New” Suspect Community. Examining the 
Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’, British Journal of Criminology, 49(5): 646-666.
Poole, E. (2002) Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. London: IB Tauris.
Poole, E. (2006) ‘The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq on British Newspaper Coverage’, in E. 
Poole, and J. E. Richardson Muslims and the News Media. London and New York: I.B. Tauris: 89-115.
Poole, E. and Richardson, J. E. (2006) Muslims and the News Media. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (and also 1984 and 1989)
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
Rehman, J. (2007) ‘Islam, “War on Terror” and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: 
Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings’, Human Rights Quarterly, 29: 
831-878.
Richardson, J. E. (2001) ‘British Muslims in the Broadsheet Press: A Challenge to Cultural Hegemony?’, 
Journalism Studies, 2(2): 221-42.
Richardson, J. E. (2004) (Mis)Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet 
Newspapers. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Rowe, J.J. (1997) Report on the Operation in 1996 of the PTA 1989.
Schlesinger, P. (1991) Media, State and Nation. London: Sage.
Silvestri, S. (2007) ‘Radical Islam: Threats & Opportunities’, Global Dialogue, 9(3-4):118-126.
Silvestri, S. (2010) ‘Public policies towards Muslims and the institutionalization of “moderate” Islam: 
some critical relections’, in A.Triandafyllidou, ed. Muslims in 21st Century Europe. London: Routledge: 
45-58.
Silvestri, S., Hickman, M., Thomas, L. & Nickels, H. (2011) ‘British government responses in two eras of 
political violence’, paper presented at BISA annual conference, Manchester, 27/04.
Solomos, J. (2003) Race and Racism in Britain, 3rd Edition. Palgrave Macmillan.
Spalek, B. and Lambert, B. (2008) ‘Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A 
critically relective approach to engagement’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 36 (4): 257-
270.
Straw, J. (1999) ‘Prevention of Terrorism Speech’, London, 16/03.
Terrorism Act 2000.
Terrorism Act 2006.
Van Dijk, T. A. (1998) ‘Opinions and Ideologies in the Press’, in A. Bell and P. Garrett (eds) Approaches to 
Media Discourse. Oxford: Blackwell: 21-63.
Yuval-Davies, N. (1997) Gender and Nation, London: Sage. 
Van Zoonen, L, Vis, F. and Mihelj, S. (2011, forthcoming) ‘Women responding to the anti-Islam ilm Fitna: 
religious voices and acts of citizenship on YouTube’, Feminist Review, 97. 
Ward, P. (2008) ‘Call yourself British? National Identity in the UK in the Twentieth Century’, Cycnos 25: 2.
 
30
11. Appendix
Methods
For the study of public discourses we needed to operationalise the collection and analysis of an immense 
amount of data, over almost four decades. 19 ‘key events’ were identiied in the period 1974-2007 to 
facilitate the data collection. This choice is neither exhaustive nor representative of what happened in 
those years in Britain in relation to Irish communities or to Muslim communities. It was determined in 
part by the need to select points in time enabling us to establish some comparisons of similar events 
and crises. For instance, we drew parallels between reactions to bomb attacks, arrests and releases of 
suspects, unlawful killings of suspects and discussion of anti-terrorism legislation. We also included 
events that are not strictly comparable, but that are signiicant political and symbolic crises or turning 
points in relation to the communities studied, such as the Rushdie affair, the ‘veil controversy’ and the 
Good Friday Agreement. 
Table 1: The key events
Irish-related events    Muslim-related events
21 November 1974: Birmingham pub bombings 14 February 1989: fatwa on Salman Rushdie
29 November 1974: adoption of the PTA  Spring/Summer 2001: race riots
3 December 1974: arrest of the Maguire Seven 9 March 2004: release of the Tipton Three
17 December 1983: Harrods Bombing  July 2005: London bombings
19 October 1989: release of the Guildford Four 22 July 2005: shooting of Jean-Charles De Menezes
14 March 1991: release of the Birmingham Six 30 March 2006: adoption of 2006 Terrorism Act
26 June 1991: release of the Maguire Seven  2 June 2006: Forest Gate anti-terrorist Raid
23 September 1996: shooting of Diarmuid O’Neill 5 October 2006: Jack Straw veil controversy
10 April 1998: Good Friday Agreement  31 January 2007: Birmingham anti-terrorism raid
20 July 2000: adoption of Terrorism Act 2000
Nine of these events pertain to Irish communities and an equal number concern Muslims. The course 
of history is such that most ‘Irish events’ are located in the past while most ‘Muslim events’ are 
concentrated in the last decade. The Terrorism Act 2000 related to both communities. Despite its 
signiicance as an event with major long-lasting global implications, we did not select 11 September 
2001 because of our focus on the speciicity of events and communities in Britain and because of the 
considerable academic attention representations of this event have already received, and which we draw 
on (for example, Ahmad 2006, Banaji and Al-Ghabban 2006, Halliday 2002, Harb and Bessaiso 2006, 
Gillespie 2006, Poole 2006).  
We set the study of the impacts of being ‘suspect’ as experienced in everyday encounters and incidents 
in the lives of people assumed to be Irish or Muslim in two cities: London and Birmingham. They were 
chosen because they are places with signiicant Irish and Muslim populations, and where bombings and/
or arrests have taken place in both eras of political violence.
Policy Study
In the policy study we examined the language adopted in the key forum for public democratic 
deliberation, Parliament (both houses), including the processes whereby laws and policies have been 
discussed, implemented, monitored and reviewed. We also examined the output of relevant ministries 
and agencies (e.g. Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Home Ofice; Police; Commission for Racial Equality), 
as well as Royal Commissions of inquiry, independent reviews, statutory bodies, and local authorities. 
We analysed speeches and programmatic statements, strategic papers, commissioned research and 
command papers, Parliamentary committee reports and minutes. We looked for substantive and 
descriptive attributes of incidents of political violence and of their perpetrators and of other key events, 
and whether (if at all) they intersected with ideas of British identity, race, ethnicity, migration and 
religion.
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Having coded and classiied (by topic, author, and typology) over 800 sets of policy documents produced 
between 1974 and 2007, we conducted a close analysis of a smaller selection grouped together in 13 
thematic ‘packages’. Typically, packages were constructed around one or more (interlocked) ‘key events’, 
and included: a speech by the Prime Minister or other Government oficial, the relevant Parliamentary 
Debate; the law or policy measure triggered by or under discussion at the time of that event; if available, 
the independent review of the implementation of the said measure; if available, research or reports 
commissioned by the establishment around an issue closely related to the given event. 
Whenever we encountered particularly relevant additional documents we examined them closely too. 
The analysis entailed tracing, dissecting and comparing over time the choice of words and phraseologies 
used to express political priorities, to identify threats, to communicate policy responses, and to refer to 
Irish communities or Muslim communities. We also considered how all these layers may have intersected 
with each other and with other external concerns. The comparison was conducted on two levels: by 
looking at similar events and proceeding thematically. 
Media Study
We analysed the press because newspapers are accessible for the period of the study, remain widely 
read, whether online or in print, and retain an agenda-setting role in national politics (Gillespie 2006). 
Little attention has been paid in academic analyses of the media to the echoes, continuities, or ruptures 
in the media coverage across the two eras, with research on the representation of Muslims in the British 
media (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Richardson, 2001, 2004) rarely 
referencing previous work done in the Irish context (an exception is Miller 1994).
Our study evaluated representations of Irish communities and Muslim communities in the national 
press (Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Guardian, Observer, Sun, News of the 
World) and in the diaspora press (Asian Times, Irish Post, Muslim News) following our 19 key events.
We collected all news items referring to these events for one month after they took place, with the 
exception of the Good Friday Agreement and the 2000 and 2006 Terrorism Acts, where periods covering 
the time span of the policy making process were collected; a three-month period was covered for the 
monthly Muslim News. Only news items referring to British Muslims or to Islam in Britain were collected 
for the July 2005 London bombings, as otherwise the number of items collected for these bombings 
alone would have been in the thousands. 
This selection process yielded a total of 2,798 news items, 39.4% of which are Irish-related, 60% 
Muslim-related, with the remaining 0.6% relating to both. Two methods were used to analyse this data: 
mapping analysis (i.e. descriptive statistical analysis establishing the typology of news coverage) and 
critical discourse analysis (Burr, 2003; Jaworski and Coupland, 2006; Van Dijk 1998). By combining these 
methods we were able to draw an overall picture of coverage of the events; evaluate the extent to which 
Irish and Muslim communities are represented as ‘suspect’; examine how these representations work 
at a more subtle level; and identify discourses that circulate in the construction of Irish and Muslim 
communities in the British press.
Key Informant Interviews
We carried out 42 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key informants in Birmingham and London. 
We selectively sampled specialised knowledge of: journalistic coverage of the eras; elected politicians at 
local and national level; legal knowledge of the system of justice across the two eras; religious leaders; 
and local organisations that address the welfare needs and cultural activities of Irish communities and 
Muslim communities. The criteria for selection of the key informants was that they be strategically 
positioned in one or more of these arenas and, where possible, have some knowledge or memory of both 
eras of political violence. The interview data was analysed using Systemic Network Analysis (see Holland 
1981, 1986). A network is an instrument or a device that enables information to be transformed into 
data relevant to the exploration of a theory, a hypothesis or guiding ideas; it is rather like a map, it allows 
distinctions to be drawn and relationships between constituent parts of the data to be represented. 
Discussion groups
Our aim in holding discussion groups was to bring Irish and Muslim people together to hold a 
conversation about their comparative experiences and views about the representation of communities 
as ‘suspect’ in Britain, in part to see if the participants thought this a useful exchange. The seven 
discussion groups took place in London (four) and Birmingham (three), and each involved between four 
and eight participants. 
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We recruited through existing contacts in both cities, a wide variety of mailing lists, through local 
community centres and in London through a large, private sector employer. The total sample consisted 
of 19 participants identifying as Muslim (10 men, nine women) and 19 as Irish (nine men, 10 women). 
The Muslim participants, a majority of whom were migrants or second generation, came from a variety 
of ethnic backgrounds including Somali, Moroccan, Yemeni, white British convert, Pakistani, Eritrean and 
Mauritian. The Irish participants were either migrants from Ireland or Northern Ireland or of Irish descent. 
The participants ranged from early 20s to late 70s, so an intergenerational, as well as inter-ethnic and 
inter-religious dynamic was a signiicant feature of the groups. 
Our aim was to include non-hegemonic voices, rather than community leaders or political activists, 
and this was achieved. It is possible that individuals who had been subject to abuse were more likely to 
respond to our search for participants. In our search, however, we stressed that the main criteria other 
than identifying as Irish or Muslim was to have lived in either city during one or both eras of political 
violence. We did not seek people who had been arrested, rather we sought people whose irst response 
was often ‘nothing has happened to me personally’. Clearly, almost all respondents had some interest 
in the topic of the discussion, but their views and experience were very varied. The data collected from 
these recorded and transcribed discussions was analysed using Fairclough’s framework of contents, 
relations and subject positions to carry out thematic and contextual analysis of the discussions 
(Fairclough 1989: 46).
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